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

The Region: The Social Psychology of Political Development

alayan Emergency: A Reconsideration of British Counter-insurgency Methods

South Vietnam: One Year after the Spring/Summer Offensive

Papua New Guinea: Australia and an Independent Papua New Guinea

Multinational Companies: Multinationals in Developing Countries

Thailand: Zonal Development - The Basic Proposition

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THE REGION:

There is an extensive literature on political and economic development in the Third World, but little on the associated psychological impact upon groups and individuals of the modernization process. This article brings together the work so far undertaken on "psychological modernization", in discussing first the attributes of a modern society, and then the psychological and social correlates, and the implications for the human personality, of modernization. It concludes by relating known personality types to the psychological requirements of a modernizing society.

The Social Psychology of Political Development

Lawrence E. Grinter

DAVID Apter has said that modernization "is like hurtling through a tunnel at frightening speed without knowing what waits at the other end."[1] Apter's point is well taken. For example, we know that the incidence of mental illness among native labourers in South African and the Congolese copper mines has grown steadily in the last twenty years. In the Philippines, a society re-experiencing internal strife, the term "amok" describes a feeling of acute depression followed by an overwhelming desire to murder. In Burma, women teach their children to conduct social relationships at various levels of reality and deception. Across the developing world riots, internal wars, and tribal conflicts accompany the modernization process. The prevalence of these psychic and social disturbances suggests that modernization incurs, or takes place within the context of, considerable psychological costs. South East Asia, an area of great ethnic, social and religious fragmentation which is currently experiencing modernization exhibits many of these traumas. Yet the literature of political and economic development is curiously scarce when it comes to research which attempts to gauge the *psychological* impact of modernization on people.

What does political and economic development in the last quarter of the 20th century require of the human personality? Is there such a thing as "psychological modernization"? Is it a pre-requisite of industrialization? To explore these questions this paper will first examine the definitions of modernization. Then it will analyse the implications of modernization for human behaviour at the group and individual levels, leading to a discussion of the structure of the human personality, and ultimately suggesting a method of measuring a human being's potential for psychological modernization, for becoming a "modern" man or woman.

* * * * * *

THE concept of development is as old as the struggle to survive. At crucial times in history one society has clearly dominated others. Athens in the Grecian peninsula from 400 to 150 B.C., Rome in the Mediterranean from 100 B.C. to 600 A.D. and the Latin American Inca empire are primary examples of these dominant societies. Yet none of these polities were "modern;" that is, none were industrialized, literate, or had mass communication systems. Nor had the spirit of science fundamentally challenged religion and superstition as a basic value of life. Perhaps, therefore, the distinction between development and modernization can be better understood by employing a definition for development which would imply that at any historical juncture, a "developed" society is one which, given a specific set of external and/or internal demands, can process these demands better than comparable societies. Of course, by this definition "modern" societies also have to be "developed." But the most "developed" country in Indo-China today — North Vietnam — is not a "modern" country. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) is neither industrialized, literate, nor urbanized. Yet compared to its neighbours, North Vietnam clearly dominates Indo-China. Thus a realistic definition of "modernization," or *development in the 20th century*, would require that a society be *both* developed *and* have industrial characteristics. In other words, "development" is a relative concept with no special historical claims; "modernization" is a time specific concept based on industrial characteristics. Development without modernization is possible and is often found in poor societies with great energy, but such a condition does not guarantee the society an ability to compete over a long period of time.

If modernization, then, represents development in a special historical period, what are the most commonly recognized characteristics of modernization? The characteristics most often cited at the societal level are: *political efficiency* or a capability of the governing system

to adapt to demands in such a way that the system is maintained; *cultural secularization* which is a rational, pragmatic approach to life; *structural differentiation* which involves the functional division of labour so that roles change and become more specialized as new structures appear; *greater political equality* or the increase of political participation as the regime becomes more accountable to larger segments of the society; *social integration* in which power and an agreed set of values spreads throughout the society; and finally *the nucleation of the population into urbanized, functional concentrations experiencing mass communication systems.*

Karl DeSchweinitz defines *political efficiency* as the development of qualitative changes which increase the efficiency with which "political output" is produced. "If over time," says DeSchweinitz, "a country is less dependent on techniques of manifest socialization, we must acknowledge that the capacity of its polity has developed."[2] Similarly Joseph LaPalambara and Myron Weiner argue that political efficiency in the form of successful day to day conflict management is a major criterion for development. Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow speak of the need for a "large volume, wide range and high efficiency" of political outputs, and Lucien Pye notes that an increase in the capacity of the political system to manage public affairs, control controversy, and cope with popular demands is required.[3]

A second trait of modernization is *cultural secularization.* For Jean Grossholtz it is "the manipulative attitude toward human interaction and a perception of politics as an extension of the set of human relationships created for dealing with strangers."[4] Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell state that it comprises a "pragmatic" rational approach to life. Others concur.[5]

In explaining *structural differentiation,* Fred Riggs states: "Whenever a structure performs a large number of functions, we may say it is functionally diffuse; when it performs a limited number, it is functionally specific."[6] S.N. Eisenstadt also posits a "high degree of differentiation in political roles and institutions" as a characteristic of modernization.[7] Almond and Powell concur as do Claude Welch, Pye, LaPalambara and Ward and Rustow.[8]

Samuel Huntington equates *political equality* with pluralism, competitiveness and the equalization and reciprocity of power.[9] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba speak of the worldwide "participation explosion." Eisenstadt calls it an "increase in the ideological and institutional accountability of the rulers to the ruled who hold potential power." Ward and Rustow concur.[10]

A fifth modern trait is *social integration.* Ralph Brainbanti refers to it as a diffusion of power to the peripheries of the society.[11] Huntington calls it "national integration." LaPalambara and Weiner view it as the "amalgamation of disparate groups" and "the regularization of structures and processes which further integration."[12]

Finally, a sixth group of authors such as C.E. Black have argued that modernization is associated with urbanization, mass literacy and mass communications.[13] Karl Deutsch lumps these characteristics into something he calls "social mobilization." Ward and Rustow see modern societies characterized by "judicial and regulatory techniques based upon a predominantly secular and impersonal system of law."[14]

* * * * * *

ALL the mentioned authors tend to concentrate on the general societal level. Other analysts, including some of this first group, focus upon specific social groups or individual characteristics associated with modernization. They see modernization as a function of the appearance of such behavioural traits as achievement norms, the spread of professional career roles, the ability to associate in groups, and the capacity for "empathy."

The leading advocate of the role of achievement motivation in modernization is David C. McClelland.[15] From his studies of high achievers and changing societies, McClelland argues that societies which have shown significant economic growth in the past were embedded with people who strove to satisfy personal needs of achievement. Accordingly, the prototype of McClelland's achieving personality is the risk-taking "entrepreneur." Like McClelland, F.X. Sutton, Pye, Ward and Rustow, LaPalambara and Riggs also include high achievement orientation in their definitions of development.[16]

Other authors suggest that modernization is associated with the concept of "careers" and role specialization. In Apter's definition a person who thinks in terms of a "career" is one who has made "adjustments to the institutions, formal organizations, and informal social relationships involved in [his] occupation, or sequence of occupations."[17] The ability of people to associate in groups for functional purposes is also stressed by Pye.[18]

Finally, Daniel Lerner has developed the concept of individual "empathy," or the psychological capacity for openness to experience. In Lerner's opinion, "modernization is primarily a state of mind – expectation of progress, propensity to growth, readiness to adapt oneself to change."[19] He sees the "modern" man as cosmopolitan, urban, liberal, secular and participant; while the "traditional" man is provincial, rural, uneducated, devout and restricted. Most of all, says Lerner, modern personalities show curiosity, tend to be experimental in nature and are open to experience.

* * * * * *

IF these are the most prevalent societal characteristics and social correlates of modernizing countries, what are their implications for behaviour at the group and individual levels? The answer seems to be that modernization requires the cultivation of a change-oriented social environment, either by channelling of social deviance into

creative endeavours or by rewarding innovative personalities. For Bert Hoselitz this means that a society will be ripe for change when the "behavioural deviance" of socially marginal groups is channelled into creative outlets allowing readjustments in the society's values. Everett Hagen, like Hoselitz, also focuses upon marginal or alienated individuals, but in contrast to Hoselitz does not restrict his theory to ethnic minorities; rather he develops a general theory of societal change.

As previously noted, McClelland argues that general outbursts of societal activity are accompanied or closely preceded by the appearance of internal motivational and achievement themes. Pye focuses upon the personality structure as the crucial variable of change when he applies Freud's concepts of Id, Ego and Super ego to the Burmese personality. Finally, Lerner argues that societies will not become modernized until people with "mobile personalities" appear.

Hoselitz believes that successful modernization requires, as the first pre-requisite, a "change-oriented" social environment.[20] He asks whether a society has enough relevant individuals or groups to "carry" the impulses of modernization. They will be found, he argues, among those people or groups which have entrepreneurial skills and understand capital investment devices. "It has been shown," says Hoselitz, "that entrepreneurship is associated with a personality pattern in which motivation is strong."[21] How can economic stagnation in a country be overcome? Most importantly, institutionalize innovation by creating a social climate in which entrepreneurs can flourish. Hoselitz points to the roles of the Syrians and the Jews in the Mediterranean and the overseas Chinese in Asia as examples of modernizing entrepreneurs. Thus says Hoselitz, a society will show the greatest chance for innovation when deviant behaviour becomes institutionalized.

> Once it becomes routinized, it ceases to be deviant, and it tends to become an accepted mode of social action. . . the institution in which it is laid down forms an advance post, so to speak, from which further deviance is possible.[22]

Perhaps a weakness of Hoselitz's approach is that it concentrates almost exclusively upon ethnically distinct groups. In Japan, in contrast, an extremely homogeneous country, change was institutionalized not by marginal ethnic groups but by the traditional elite.

Like Hoselitz, Everett Hagen has also constructed a theory of social change. But, in contrast to Hoselitz, Hagen presents a general theory of societal change.[23] Hagen believes that modernization requires: (1) fairly widespread creativity, (2) the encouragement of rational problem-solving abilities, and (3) the growth of new attitudes toward manual-technical labour.[24] He suggests that the indicators of high creativity in a developing country are the appearance of what McClelland called the "need for achievement," of what Lerner termed "openness to experience" and, thirdly, the manifestation of problem-solving capabilities. Modernization is inhibited by submissiveness to authority, inherited status and over-reliance on community consensus. Excessive dependence upon authority explains "why many people in traditional societies not only follow traditional methods, but seem to cling almost compulsively to them....."[25] The key to social change then is "status withdrawal," which occurs when a group of individuals, usually a traditional elite, is deprived of its customary status. Retreatism sets in, resulting in a situation where the frustration and anxiety are brought into the home and are inherited by the children. Seeing no alternatives open to them, these children cease to have role expectations of the intensity their parents had. The immediate male offspring, who eventually become fathers, take out their frustrations in the home by becoming authoritarian figures. But, by the third or fourth generation radical changes have begun. The wives of the fourth generation sons, not feeling the self-pity of their husbands, react to the home environment and begin instilling creative and aggressive drives into their children. Gradually there emerges "a group of individuals, creative, alienated from traditional values, driven by a gnawing burning desire to prove themselves, seeking an area. . . in which they can gain power."[26] It is this generation, says Hagen, which turns upon the current status group and moves to assert itself through innovation and demands for change.

David McClelland, from his reading of Freud and his experiments with dreams, detected three "inner concerns" which he posited as crucial to the modernization process. These are (1) the need for achievement, (2) the need for affiliation, and (3) the need for power.[27] What produces the need to achieve? McClelland finds that it is usually acquired in early life, perhaps by the age of eight or ten. He cites studies which show that boys with high needs to achieve usually come from families in which the parents stressed self-reliance and mastery. But achieving children are also found in societies with fatherless homes such as in war-torn countries.[28] To McClelland, the prototype of the modern high achiever is the entrepreneur. He argues that entrepreneurs pursue money more to prove their financial ability than to amass wealth, and, they show a willingness to take risks. Typically they pick friends from people with proven expertise rather than congenial personalities.

Lucien Pye in his book *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, has stated that:

> The problems of nation building. . .seem to reside in that complex of attitudes and practices which we may call the political culture and which reflects both the historical evolution of the society and the psychological reactions to social change. . . .[29]

Pye writes that modernization begins with the fostering of harmonious inter-personal group attitudes which give rise to more effective organizational behaviour. Using Burmese society as his laboratory, Pye utilizes Freudian psychoanalytic concepts. He relates Freud's concept of

the Id, the instincts, to the Burmese notion of *Awza*. *Awza* encapsulates the drives for dominance, status and pleasure. The pursuit of *Awza* would be extreme, says Pye, if it were not for the moderating effect of *An-ah-deh*, a kind of inner psychological restraining mechanism.[30] *An-ah-deh* is equivalent to Freud's Ego, whose function is to permit expression of safe forms of the instincts. Reinforced by the Super ego, the mind's container of the society's values and taboos, *An-ah-deh* is in constant struggle with *Awza* in the Burmese personality. Thus for Pye the cause of Burma's failure to modernize more quickly is psychological: the debilitating struggle within the Burmese personality as the instincts crash against the weakly formed Ego and Super ego. Socialized into erratic behaviour towards authority and society, the Burmese withdraws from ostensible conflict in his personal relations, thus precluding the drive to innovate emphasized by Hagen, Hoselitz, and McClelland. Victimized by the struggle between the instincts and the society's taboos, the Burmese oscillates between conflict avoidance and the spirit of revenge which, as Pye sees it, helps give Burma one of the highest murder rates in the world.

One of the most interesting approaches to personality modernization is Daniel Lerner's concept of "empathy" presented in his book, *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Lerner argues that for a country to modernize, it must have citizens with a participant or change-oriented mentality. He finds that low education, rural residence, and static backgrounds produce an unwillingness to identify with larger and more unfamiliar spheres of human activity. To change this style of life, Lerner prescribes the development of the "mobile personality," one capable of "empathy."[31] People in traditional societies, says Lerner, must

> come to see the social future as manipulable rather than ordained and [see] their personal problems in terms of achievement rather than heritage. . .whereas traditional man tended to reject innovation by saying, "It has never been thus," the contemporary Westerner is more likely to ask, "Does it work?" and try the new way without further ado.[32]

Aware of the geographical and transportation constraints which often preclude mobility in developing countries, Lerner argues that the spread of "mediated experience" through mass communications can be a successful substitute for actual experience. Thus Lerner equates physical and vicarious experience in this regard stating that the mass media has become the great teacher of inter-personal manipulation.[33] Accordingly, "the model of behaviour developed by modern society," says Lerner

> . . .is empathy, a high capacity for rearranging the self-system on short notice. Whereas. . .traditional society functioned well on the basis of a highly constrictive personality. . .modernization . . .has involved the great characterological transformation we call psychic mobility.[34]

* * * * * *

THE above arguments strongly suggest that as societies modernize we should anticipate that *certain kinds of personalities are clearly more adaptable to change and innovation than others*. If that is the case, is the detection and measurement of these personalities, a kind of psychological mapping of development possible? In this section personality types will be explored, then in the next section a method for measuring them will be presented.

The field of personality theory, or "personology" as it is called in psychological jargon, has produced a number of important theoretical books in recent years. However, it was not until 1968, when Salvatore Maddi published his *Personality Theories*,[35] that a framework capable of including all the major approaches to personality appeared. Maddi believes that all theories of personality are structured around two key concepts: (1) the core characteristics, or overall direction and purpose of a person's life and (2) the peripheral traits, or concrete, individual life-styles.

Maddi divides the theories of personality into three basic models derived by grouping the most prevalent core characteristics. "In studying and using personality theories extensively," he says,

> . . .I have come to the conclusion that the smallest number of categories into which they can be ordered is three. The essential meaning of the categories is captured by calling them the *conflict model*, the *fulfilment model* and the *consistency model*. . . .[36] (Author's Italics).

In the *conflict* model, the personality is seen as continuously in the grip of two great forces. This conflict may result from the clash of the individual personality with society or result from both forces arising within the individual. In the *fulfilment* model, however, only one great force exists within the person, and life is construed as the progressive expression or unfolding of this force. The force may be a kind of genetic blueprint or it may consist of a more abstract ideal. In the *consistency* model, little attention is directed to the collision or unfolding of great forces. Instead the emphasis is upon the formative influence of feedback from the external world. If that feedback is consistent with the person's expectations, quiescence results; if it is inconsistent, there is pressure to reduce the discrepancy, which Leon Festinger called "cognitive dissonance manipulation."[37]

It is known from the earlier discussion above that modernization requires people to associate in functional groups, to adopt impersonal, secular values and to condition their personalities to change. However it is also known that high degrees of psychic and social violence tend to accompany the process. Indeed, from a mental viewpoint modernization may be the single most violent process in the world today. It would seem, therefore, that the conflict model of personality theory would have particular relevance to the requirements of psychological adjustment during modernization.

Within changing societies, socially marginal individuals

and status-deprived groups experience considerable psychic and social conflict. The question is whether these tensions can be channelled into creative activities which open the society to progressive readjustments or whether, as Pye found to be the case in Burma, these conflicts drive the personality into oscillations between conflict avoidance and uncontrolled violence. In other words, for societies to modernize, certain groups and individuals must find ways of realizing goals and fulfilling needs. At the individual level the tendency to actualize one's potentialities and to strive toward superiority, if realized, brings considerable satisfaction. Therefore, to stimulate modernization, frustrations must be reduced and people must be able to build self-esteem. They have to be rewarded for competence, adaptability and creativity. However, finding creative outlets for psychic and social conflict in developing countries, which can also give individuals a sense of fulfilment and should be part of a controllable planned process, is very difficult to ensure. We cannot predict what the tensions of modernization may entail for any one group of people. Nevertheless when in developing countries change-oriented individuals seek to test their experiences against their predictions, the basis of a more rational approach to modernization at the individual level is being forged.

The Conflict Model. Sigmund Freud pioneered the conflict approach to personality theory when he invented the concepts of Id, Ego and Super ego.[38] To Freud the core tendency of the human personality was the maximization of instinctual gratification. The Id was the sum of these instincts and if left alone, would proceed to maximize instinctual gratification *without regard to external reality.* However, with experience, the mind differentiates into the Ego, whose purpose is to repress those aspects of the Id which could engender punishment or guilt. Finally a third portion of the mind, the Super ego, is formed. It contains the mind's impressions of the society's values and taboos. Conflict between the Id and Super ego is inevitable.

The implications of Freud's concepts for the psychological aspects of social change in developing areas such as South-East Asia are enormous. Parents in South East Asian societies are raising their children in cultures where the content and influence of social taboos are undergoing rapid change. Given the uneven changes that modernization engenders, the child's Super ego, the mind's concept of the society's cultural implants, is no longer consistent from strata to strata within the society. Thus, values change in uneven fashion across the society, carrying with them the potential for extremely divergent degrees of socialization, commitments to the existing order, and individual behaviour. One obvious result is the tendency toward violence. This approach to the problem seems particularly relevant to South-East Asia.

If, as Freud said, conflict is indeed inevitable in all personalities, then the application of psychoanalytic theory to the problem of societal modernization should have large pay-offs. It can clarify why people are tense during major social changes and it may suggest methods for smoothing their adjustment. Psychic stress, if it can be properly channelled, may lead to what Lerner had in mind when he advocated the development of "empathy," the capacity "for rearranging the self-system on short notice."

The Fulfilment Model. The core characteristic associated with the fulfilment model of personality is the tendency to actualize one's potentialities and drive towards perfection or superiority. These characteristics clearly imply an optimism toward overcoming the mental conflict which Freud, in the first model, foresaw as inevitable.

One of the most popular fulfilment theorists is Eric Fromm.[39] Unlike Freud, Fromm does not assume a basic antagonism between man and society. Instead he stresses co-operative and productive expression. In all his works, Fromm emphasizes man's need to relate to other people and to associate productively. He suggests, however, that different personality types have prevailed in earlier societies. He feels that "exploiting" and "hoarding" personalities dominated 18th and 19th Century Europe, while the "marketing" orientation characterizes human personality in the 20th Century. He describes it as "purposeful," "open-minded," "experimenting," "curious," and "adaptive."[40] Certainly Hagen, Lerner and McClelland would agree with Fromm that modernization requires this kind of a personality structure.

The Consistency Model. Consistency theory emphasizes the prediction or control of one's experience, minimizing the discrepancy between expectation and occurrence. This personality type is largely conditioned by feedback and learned perception. Feedback provides the linkage between expectation and experience. Thus the consistency model of personality puts an emphasis on adjustive, analytical personalities.

Consistency theory has been carefully articulated by two American psychologists: George A. Kelly and David C. McClelland.[41] Kelly believes the core tendency of each person is his desire to predict and control his experience. The personality attempts to anticipate events or reactions by matching "constructs" of reality against actual experience. Anxiety results when one is confronted with events lying outside one's control. Hostility arises when one tries unsuccessfully to extort validational evidence in favour of one's previous prediction. In a similar fashion McClelland believes that the core tendency of the personality is to keep discrepancies between expectation and experience minimal. So as to regulate experience, the mind develops "approach" (confidence of success) motives or "avoidance" (fear of failure) motives. Approach motives are prevalent in people who experience small discrepancies (or who rationalize them away) between expectation and occurrence; avoidance motives are found in people who experience large discrepancies. At times McClelland has equated his concept of need for achievement with strong approach motives.

Is there a single personality type which best incorporat-

es the most useful components of these personality models so as to help people adjust to the requirements of modernization? Probably not, although if any one personality type seems most to encapsulate the totality of human drives, needs and abilities required for modernization, it is probably McClelland's "entrepreneur." Entrepreneurs seem to have the most effective combination of conflict drives, fulfilment needs and consistency orientations. They are driven to prove themselves and are willing to take risks. They gain fulfilment in economic speculation and capital investments, functions badly needed in modernizing societies. Yet, like scientists, they demand feedback on their decisions, readjusting their plans to the market's dynamics as they attempt to minimize discrepancies between their predictions and their experience.

* * * * *

VALID measurement of the psychological and social aspects of modernization is extremely difficult. Techniques of cross-cultural psychological testing are still being developed. Problems of interviewing, cultural specificity, data interpretation, and instrument standardization make comparative attitude and behaviour research risky. In developing regions, especially those experiencing rapid change and social trauma, such as South-East Asia, attempts to measure rural attitudes scientifically have often failed. Without firm conceptual frameworks, attitude and personality measurement in traditional and transitional societies quickly degenerates into a maze of responses where everything is assumed to be critical and, as a result, nothing takes on real importance. The situation is further complicated by the lack of clear cutting-points on the generally accepted developmental continuum of "traditional," "transitional," and "modern," or "post-industrial" societies. And as Emitai Etzioni and Edward Lehman have pointed out, we cannot divide human or societal change into neat social, psychological or economic slices.[42] In short, the science of cross cultural social and psychological mapping is still in its infancy.[43]

Nevertheless, since our perspective emphasizes psychological modernization we will suggest a prototype measurement system which places the individual or the group on a continuum of motives relevant to the general categories of traditional, transitional and modern societies. Figure 1 is the starting point.

The blocks on the left of the figure present a widely held view in psychology of the hierarchy of human motives.[44] From Figure 1, our assumption is that the key to diagnosing whether a society is modern, transitional or traditional, in which direction it is moving and at what relative speed, will be found by determining which clusters of fundamental human motives are most predominant within the society.

Our hypotheses are shown on the right side of Figure 1. We assume that predominantly traditional societies reveal a vast majority of people whose daily motives focus around the most basic aspects of existence: food, shelter, staving off sickness. However, in the transitional society, while many people—perhaps a majority—still remain concerned with physiological needs, a significant number of others have begun to find occupations away from the countryside, in manufacturing and mining, for example. Still others, such as small businessmen and entrepreneurs, are promoting economic and social change. The range of motives in the transitional society is much broader than in the traditional society; peoples' occupations, their anxieties, and their expectations cover a wide field. Not

FIGURE 1


HIERARCHY OF HUMAN MOTIVES
HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIP OF THE MOTIVES SHOWN AT LEFT TO DEGREES OF MODERNIZATION
Achievement and Self-Actualization
Prestige and Self Esteem
Love and Belongingness
Safety Motives, Anxiety and Aggression
Physiological Motives
Motives Most Prevalent in *Modern* Societies
Motives Most Prevalent in *Transitional* Societies
Motives Most Prevalent in *Traditional* Societies

surprisingly, instances of social dislocation, stress and violence are prevalent in transitional societies. Finally, there is the modern society: industrial secular, impersonal, functionally organized, urban, literate and penetrated by mass communications. The dominant human motives in the modern or post-industrial society reflect orientations toward achievement and self-actualization. Accordingly they are accompanied by elaborate career structures, empathy and psychic mobility.

Numerous exceptions exist to the relationships argued above between psychological motives and the degree of a society's modernity. As became apparent in the United States in the 1960s, there are and continue to be pockets of people in "modern" countries who continue to fight daily for shelter, food, and physical survival. And in traditional and developing societies, there are people who greatly resemble "moderns" in education, values and motives. Thus, at times, all categories of development are heterogeneous. However, in general, the correlation of personal motives to levels of modernization, as shown in Figure 1, seems accurate.

Therefore, from Hoselitz, Hagen and McClelland, *the psychological strategy of modernizing a country* is based on encouraging social policies which foster controlled individual self-actualization, self-esteem, and the need to achieve. Psychological modernization becomes the strategy of *purposely embedding a society* with people who, freed of physiological motives, are rewarded for associating in functional groups and encouraged to pursue achievement norms. Thus any method for detecting and reinforcing the psychological drives required for modernization must be based on first detecting the general cluster of motives, such as those shown in Figure 1, and then testing their relationship to the characteristics of modernization outlined earlier in this paper. The measurement device must also judge the relative weight and scope of these motives within the society. Figure 2 presents a summary of the kinds of questions which can clarify the degree to which a society is psychologically "modern." A major difficulty, to which allusion has already been made, is obtaining accurate, unbiased responses about peoples' *real* motives without contaminating either the questions or the answers. Indirect interview techniques continue to be one of the more promising methods.[45]

From the categories in Figure 2 we can assume that if wide stratas of the population feel helpless, associate almost entirely with immediate relatives, feel the future is unpredictable or ominous, are submissive to authority, have had little experience with group activities, and are politically unaware or uninvolved, then major environmental and personality change is required before modernization can begin. However, if a fair number of people show a need to achieve, are confident of their capabilities, associate daily with people in working situations, tend to be relatively optimistic toward the future, have been exposed to mass media, have experience of groups and are becoming politically aware, then important sectors of the population are psychologically prepared to carry the drive toward modernization. *In summary, a strategy of psychological modernization in developing countries depends first upon detecting and second reinforcing the mental and emotional capabilities required for modernization. The process is incomparably simpler to prescribe than to carry out.*

Figure 2. *Measuring Psychological Modernization*

Within each measurement area, the higher the person's score in general, the more modern or adaptable to change his personality.

Area A: Most Pressing Daily Needs
1) Food, warmth, shelter
2) Safety
3) Belonging
4) Self-esteem
5) Self-improvement
6) Tangible rewards of success
7) Need to achieve

Area B: Perception of Self
1) I am caught in circumstances beyond my control.
2) My life is determined by my origins.
3) Despite many obstacles, a man can change his life.
4) I am the master of my own destiny.

Area C: Most Frequent Associates
1) Immediate relatives.
2) Neighbours
3) Congenial acquaintances
4) People in working situations
5) People with skills

Area D: Attitudes toward the Future
1) The future is unpredictable and ominous.
2) With luck man can influence the future.
3) The future is man-made and manipulable.

Area E: Attitudes toward Authority
1) People in positions of authority are morally superior.
2) It is useless to attempt something unless it has a superior's approval.
3) People in positions of authority got there by both luck and skill.
4) Authority comes to those who earn it through hard work.

Area F: Source of Opinions
1) Village elders
2) Parents, relatives
3) Peers, associates
4) Media (newspapers, books, films, television)

Area G: Education
1) No experience with education.
2) Some formal education (village school, etc.)
3) Grade school and above

Area H: Experience with Groups and Organizations*
1) Most of my experience has been with my family or relatives.
2) I have some experience with groups (tribal associations, school experiences, religious groups, etc.)
3) I am a member of a functional group (merchant association, labour union, the army).
4) I hold a position of responsibility (decision-making) in a functional group.

Area I: Experience with Government*
1) I have no knowledge of Government.
2) Government is relatively unimportant to me.
3) Government has some effect on my life.
4) Government is an important factor in my life.

Area J: Perceptions of Government's Intentions*
1) The Government is run by self-serving men out to exploit us.
2) The Government is interested in the people's needs.
3) The Government tries to improve conditions.

Area K: Perceptions of Government's Impact*
1) The Government makes no difference.
2) Sometimes the Government improves conditions; sometimes it does not.

Area L: Political Involvement*
1) I have no interest or involvement in politics.
2) I sometimes talk politics.
3) I am periodically active in politics (letters, contributions, volunteer work, or as an elected or appointed official, etc.).

* Areas H to L are related to the types of questions found in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Little, Brown and Co., Boston and Toronto, 1968).

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THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY: *British forces won a slow and methodical counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya between 1948 and 1960, employing the twin methods of a resettlement programme and a strategy of denying the jungle as a safe refuge for the terrorists. The British authorities showed that it is possible to win such a campaign while remaining within the rule of law, applied strictly but indiscriminately. They also demonstrated the values of a co-ordinated approach of all agencies to an insurgency situation, efficient intelligence work and the promotion of good government as a corollary of counter-insurgency operations.*

A reconsideration of British counter-insurgency methods

W.G. Stefaniak

ON the morning of 16 June, 1948, two British Rubber Estate managers and one assistant manager were murdered by Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.) terrorists in the Sungli Siput area and a State of Emergency was declared in parts of Perak and Johore.[1] On the next day the State of Emergency was extended over the whole country.[2] The M.C.P. had launched its armed revolt against the British Administration in Malaya.

Thus began 12 years of struggle for Malaya which ended with Malaya becoming a prosperous, independent nation and a substantial defeat for the M.C.P. It is the purpose of this article to examine the methods the British applied to defeat the insurgency and the effect they had on the course of the struggle.

It is most important when discussing British counter-insurgency methods to understand the type of organization they were fighting and that organization's strategy and plans. It is a pre-requisite to understanding fully the measures Britain took and why they took them.

The M.C.P. planned for a three-stage guerrilla war.

In the first place they planned to destroy the economy by attacking the tin mines and rubber plantations, and, by burning mine machinery.

Slashing rubber trees and killing mine managers and estate owners drove the remaining managers and planters into the towns and out of the countryside.

Also included in the first phase was the plan to attack local police stations and even badly protected army depots and of course, lines of communication. These measures, it was hoped, would throw the government off balance and force it to retreat to the towns.

With the countryside falling into their hands and the economy in a shambles, the M.C.P. then planned to move on to stage two, which was the period when the countryside was consolidated and liberated zones were established in areas under M.C.P. control. The idea was that the "...villages must be used to encircle the towns".[3]

With the government on the defensive and being forced back to defend the large towns and main communication lines stage three would begin and the Malayan Peoples' Anti-British Army (M.P.A.B.A.) from now on with the help of the people (who by this time would be rising up to support it) would throw the British out of Malaya and take over complete control.[4] Stage three would be a war of movement and set battles.

The M.C.P. never got beyond Stage One. The M.P.A.B.A. at the outbreak of hostilities comprised 4-5000 men under arms, divided up into groups of 200-400 which were called, rather pretentiously, "Regiments." At this stage they were divided up into large groups of 100-300 for attacks on police stations, plantations and mines. [5]

The M.C.P. hierarchy began with the cell organization in the village, comprising ideally, about six people for a village of 1,000. Each person was responsible for certain departments like supplies, propaganda, finance, intelligence, security and traitor elimination. This was the core of the Min Yuen organization in the villages and each cell organized or coerced support from among the villagers. The villagers were intimidated and coerced or persuaded to give whatever the local Min Yuen branch wanted. If they did they were otherwise left alone and if they did not they would be dealt with by the local Min Yuen traitor elimination unit.[6]

Recruits from the Min Yuen organization in the villages were chosen for the local M.P.A.B.A. unit.

The next step up the ladder was the Branch, which was responsible for organizing the Min Yuen organization in several villages. Than came the Branches Committee and above it, the District Committee; then the State Commit-

tee followed by the Regional Bureau (as the M.C.P., like the Security Forces, divided Malaya into two Zones, North and South) and culminating in the Central Committee of the M.C.P. with Chin Peng as Secretary-General. At the top of the tree was the Inner Cabinet or Politburo of three members, headed by Chin Peng.[7]

The M.P.A.B.A. as mentioned, was divided into Regiments. There were ten of these, and each regiment was formally divided into companies, but more often than not they were divided into platoons of 15-30 men, which were amalgamated in the early stages of the Emergency at least, into a large group for attacks on defended utilities and outposts. The platoons were divided into Sections, often of no more then five or six men.[8]

* * * * *

THIS then was the organization that faced the British Administration in 1948. It operated throughout Malaya, although the weaker States of the Federation were very quiet throughout the Emergency and Johore was the worst affected State, having three M.P.A.B.A. regiments operating within its bounds,[9] but the M.P.A.B.A. was limited in its operational scope as it was confined to the Chinese community. The M.P.A.B.A. only had one Malay (and Indian) regiment which was stationed in Pahang State, and this regiment became a Chinese regiment after 1950.[10] Due to its basically Chinese composition the M.P.A.B.A. did not interfere very much with Malay *kampongs*, as the Malays tended to look on it as a Chinese Army which wanted to take over Malaya so that the Chinese could rule. The Malays tended to tell the British if they saw M.P.A.B.A. units in or around their *kampongs*.

The M.P.A.B.A. had a limited mass base, consisting of the squatters, mostly Chinese, who lived on the edge of towns and mining areas or plantations, and on the jungle fringes, where they cultivated plots of land, growing a number of crops and in particular vegetables of which they grew the majority of Malaya's supply.[11]

The Squatters and their re-settlement will be covered at greater length later on in this paper, but it is worth mentioning at this point that the planters and miners (who employed squatters in large numbers as labourers and tappers) in 1948 asked the government to take drastic action to prevent the use of squatters by the Min Yuen. Indeed, the government of Malaya realized the threat M.C.P. domination of the Squatters presented and Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner of Malaya after September 1948, asked each State in the early months of 1948 to investigate the problem in its own area and recommend action which he suggested should be uniform throughout the country.[12] British fear was indeed justified, as the M.C.P. was setting up among the Squatters a corresponding administrative structure (based on terror and intimidation) to the government administration which had never established any real control over them.

* * * * *

THE British in 1948 had 10,000 troops, comprising five British, six Gurkha and two Malay Battalions in Malaya. The Federation Police had 10,223 officers and men and were 2,000 men under-strength.[13] Within three months of the Emergency being declared 24,000 special constables ("Specials") joined the force; the vast majority of whom were Malays.[14] These men were untrained and were used for static guard duty on plantations and mines, with the planters giving them their initial training in the first few months.[15] The estates of the planters and the mines did not fall in the early months of the Emergency due largely to the efforts of the planters and miners and their motley crew of Special Constables. By the end of the year several hundred demobilized British sergeants had arrived from Palestine to take over the training of the "Specials", and some units of "Specials" had even started patrolling their area in search of terrorists.[16]

In 1948 the Communist terrorists launched attacks against mines, plantations, communications and isolated village Police Posts. Often 100 or 200 terrorists would attack a Police Station, guarded and manned by only two or three Malay constables, and it was due to the courage of these Malay policemen that the vast majority of Stations remained in police hands. This was most important in this early stage of the war as it meant that the government was represented and seen throughout the country. Once a Police Station gave into M.P.A.B.A. pressure or came to some arrangement with the terrorists, that village passed effectively under M.C.P. control. Few did.

The government's initial reaction was to increase the size of the Police Force and within a few months the regular Federation Police numbered 30,000 and by the beginning of 1949 there were also 30,000 "Specials".[17]

The M.C.P. was banned in July 1948 and its known staff which had not gone into the jungle were arrested.

The British Army was called in support of the civilian power and over the next few months the Army split itself up into units of company strength stationed in a central position between a group of villages, so as to be able to get to the scene of any trouble in the area within thirty or forty minutes and then pursue the Terrorists relentlessly back into the jungle.[18] "Ferret Force" was formed out of the remnants of the old Force 36 of World War II fame, and harried the Terrorists in their jungle lairs, attacked their large camps of 100 men or more, kept the terrorists on the move and off-balance and did not allow them to establish any secure base areas.[19]

The setting up of company bases in between a group of villages and the activities of "Ferret Force" forced the M.P.A.B.A. to give up most of its large-scale operations and break up into smaller, less formidable groups. "Ferret Force" was however disbanded within a few months, largely due to jealousy between the police and army over its administration and composition, and its men were spread around the various battalions of the British

Army in Malaya to impart their technique and knowledge.[20]

Another initial British measure was the telephoning of isolated estates, mines and police posts every hour. If the line was dead it usually meant the M.P.A.B.A. was operating against that place, and a "posse" would be sent out immediately to check.[21] The new Police Commissioner, Col. Gray, also created a radio link between State Headquarters and district centres, towns, villages and Kampongs.[22]

* * * * *

ON 17 July 1948, the Emergency Regulations Ordinance was enacted by the Legislative Council.[23] It gave great power to the government, which gravely affected the liberty of the individual, but it enabled the government to pass the necessary ordinances and grant the necessary powers to itself to prosecute the Emergency while still remaining within the law and without having to resort to martial law. It enabled the government to conduct the Emergency on a legal basis as the legal government of the country, and this is a corner-stone of British counter-insurgency strategy, not only in Malaya, but throughout the world.

The first regulation enacted was the National Registration Regulation which required all persons over 12 years of age to be registered, and lists were kept at district police stations of all persons in the district. The police kept a copy of each person's photograph and thumb print at the station where that person registered.

Identity cards (ID) were to be carried by all persons (over 12) at all times so as to distinguish the bandits (as they were called) from the rest of the population.[24] The registration of the population was completed by March 1949.[25]

The most effective use of registration powers was for the police to set up a cordon in the early morning around a village and screen everyone in the village. Anyone who should not have been there was picked up and anyone whose absence could not satisfactorily be explained, was thereafter a particular target for police surveillance.

Identity cards were very important things and the owner was given the incentive to keep this card in good condition and to look after it as it was needed to obtain a food ration, and, after 1950, space in a re-settled area as well as many other necessities of life. Life with an ID Card was a lot easier than life without one. The M.C.P. did all they could to steal, burn and destroy the ID cards. They tried forging the cards for their own use, but the forgeries were easily spotted; they shot photographers and ID card holders, and attacked Government Registration teams visiting remote villages and kampongs.[26] The M.C.P. were unsuccessful.

The Government issued Tally sticks to workers going into the fields, and their ID cards were handed back when they returned home that afternoon. If the Tally sticks were taken by the terrorists, it was only a minor nuisance for the owner of the ID card to re-establish his identity at the Police Station which had his photograph and thumb-print duplicates.[27]

The ID cards prevented the terrorists moving freely along the roads between villages and clandestine couriers found it more difficult to deliver messages. M.C.P. people staying the night in villages always took the risk of a spot ID card check.

The second most important regulation was the power to arrest and detain without trial for up to two years. The Police Review Board was also set up as a safeguard for abuses of this power.[28] Even before the Emergency the government had the power to deport unruly, troublesome Chinese to China, and this power was now used occasionally in conjunction with the detention regulation mentioned above.

Regulation 17D was perhaps the harshest of the early regulations. Under it, the High Commissioner could detain all the people in a village or area which was proved to have been aiding the terrorists. It affected the innocent and guilty alike and was used only 16 times in the first nine months of 1949, when 6,343 people were detained.[29] Once resettlement had been carried out this regulation was not so necessary and was rarely used.

Other early regulations included searches of private property without warrants (which was essential for snap checks on villages by the Police); the death penalty for the carrying of unauthorized weapons (although the sentence was a discretionary one and could also be commuted or dropped altogether, if the arrested person was willing to assist the police in capturing terrorists or Min Yuen members and supporters); curfew powers were also provided for and they were flexible to allow the authorities to vary the curfew to suit the particular situation in a given area, and there was also a ten-year imprisonment provided for anyone caught possessing M.C.P. documents. In all there were 53 Regulations passed between 1949-1953.[30]

* * * * *

IN April, 1949 the M.P.A.B.A. changed its tactics. Casualties had been high during the big raids of 200 men or so and the new plan was to destroy the local government, especially police stations in the villages and not destroy the tin mines or rubber plantations as the Chinese masses regarded such action as a senseless waste harmful to their living standards.

The M.P.A.B.A. changed it's name to the Malayan Races' Liberation Army (M.R.L.A.) in the hope of winning more support from among the Malays and Indians. Chin Peng now aimed to form a People's Republic by the "oil spot" technique of taking village by village in an area until his control encompassed the whole area.[31] This plan did not work and the isolated police

posts held out against the renewed attacks by the M.R.L.A.

In 1949 the British were controlling the Emergency and it was not spreading, but they were not winning. The M.C.P. still had its source of recruits, supplies, food and information from the Ming Yuen and its supporters in the squatter villages.

The incidence of M.C.P. action had decreased while the M.C.P. was re-organizing. This led the British to believe they were winning. They were rudely awakened in October, when the number of incidents rose to 400, – 300 more than in September.[32] Trains were derailed, buses held up and burned, police ambushed and killed and mines and estates attacked.

In February 1950, 23 persons including 13 police, were killed in an attack on the police station at Bukit Kampong in Johore and by May 1950 the M.R.L.A. had won back the initiative and that month saw a record number of 534 incidents.[33]

Whitehall was still indecisive and complacent and there was no real co-ordination between the police, army or civil administration in Malaya itself. Operations were carried out on the basis of compromise between army and police methods and the police were critical of the army's indelicacy in handling operations, while the army was scornful of the slow and deliberate way the police went about their operations. The civil authorities accused the army of not understanding their problems and regarded many army officers as rude and brash.

Despite such novelties as "anti-Bandit Month",[34] the population as a whole, especially the Chinese, were not helping the British. Most Chinese were sitting on the fence. They did not know, after Britain recognized Communist China in January 1950, whether the British really intended to prosecute the war seriously and despite Gurney's statements of re-assurance, they were wary of supporting the British in case their relations in China should suffer retaliations. It was safer to wait and see who was definitely winning before coming down on one side or the other.

* * * * *

AMID all this disillusionment the British Government sent out in April 1950 Lt. General Sir Harold Briggs (a 55-year-old, ex-officer who had spent most of his life in Asia and was a former leader of the 5th Indian Division in Burma) to wage war and nothing else.[35]

Briggs, as Director of Operations, was ".....to plan, co-ordinate and direct the anti-bandit operations of the police and armed forces".[36] He was to work as a civilian under Sir Henry Gurney and he never managed to get the executive powers from the British government he felt he needed (he did not have the power to co-ordinate the action of the civil departments) but he was to originate a master plan which effectively won the war for the British.[37] It is at this stage of the Emergency that the most effective of the British counter-insurgency tactics were initiated.

Briggs in his first directive (issued two weeks after he arrived) put his finger on the crux of the matter. The war was a competition in government and the Briggs Plan was based on this premise. The plan had four main aims. The first aim was to dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete security which would in time result in a steady and increasing flow of information coming from all sources. Secondly, the Communist organization within the populated areas had to be broken to (thirdly) isolate the bandits from the food and supply and information-giving organization in the populated areas. With these three aims accomplished, the fourth aim would be realized which was for the bandits to be destroyed by forcing them to attack the security forces on their own ground when they (the bandits) left the jungle in search of food, supplies and information.

The army was to maintain a permanent framework of troops deployed in close co-operation with the police to cover the towns and villages which the police could not adequately handle themselves. The army's principal task was to dominate the jungle up to five hours journey from the villages, and headquarters were to be established in populated areas to increase the locals' sense of security. Army elements were also to deploy and live on the fringe of the jungle up to three hours' march from the roads and jungle paths.[38] This was called territorial consolidation.

Briggs realized his plan would never be effective if there was not better co-operation between the civil, police and military authorities and he realized these arms of government had to be co-ordinated at all levels and must work as a team and to a common plan, so in April 1950 he set up the Federal War Council (F.W.C.) comprising the Chief Secretary of the Federation, the Secretary of Defence, the Chiefs of the Armed Forces and Police with Briggs as Director of Operations. Later in the year membership was extended to include two Malays and one Chinese and a European planting representative under the chairmanship of the High Commissioner.[39] This council mapped out the Emergency policy.

Under the F.W.C. was the Director of Operations Committee (D.O.C.) headed by Briggs and consisting of the Service Chiefs, the Commissioner of Police and a representative of the Defence Minister. This body met regularly, at least weekly, and took policy decisions on the use of the Security Forces within the wide policy agreed on by the F.W.C.[40]

The D.O.C. thrashed out policy and then issued directives and operational instructions to the State War Executive Committee (S.W.E.C.) who passed them on to the District War Executive Committees (D.W.E.C.)

It was the D.W.E.C.'s and the tiny operations' committees at area level (below the D.W.E.C.'s and the lowest level on the ladder) which formed the ground level for action against the terrorists. It was at these lower levels that most action originated. [41]

Each State had its S.W.E.C. headed by the Mentri Besar (the Malay State Prime Minister) or the British Adviser, and the Resident Commissioners in the Settlements. [42] The S.W.E.C. and D.W.E.C. had their respective military, civil and police members and within each S.W.E.C. or D.W.E.C. was an Operations Committee which was responsible for the day-to-day executive control of the security operations. In each committee it was a matter of pooling ideas and "discussion and decision" in which every member contributed. There was an insistence on complete military and police co-operation and this was exemplified by the establishment of joint military policy operation rooms in all areas, jointly manned by police, military and Special Branch officers and through which all intelligence and incident reports were channelled. [43]

Chairmanship in all these committees was with the Civilian Administrator because he was responsible for law and order and the aim of all operations was to restore his area to a condition in which he could govern without the army and with only nominal police support. He was also the best man to decide what would be the attitude of the people in his area to proposed measures.

The police and military members were commanders in person and they could make decisions on the spot. [44] A Home Guard officer attended S.W.E.C.'s, D.W.E.C.'s, the D.O.C. and the F.W.C. in an advisory capacity. [45]

Richard Miers, a colonel commanding a battalion in the mid-fifties, said in his book *"Shoot to Kill"*, that in the Kluang D.W.E.C. operations committee the Special Branch man was the most important member (see discussion of Special Branch below), and that the D.W.E.C. operations committee met each morning for "morning prayers" to discuss the latest developments and plan courses of action. [46]

A later development of the S.W.E.C.'s and D.W.E.C.'s was to allow unofficial members such as community leaders representing local industry, racial and religious groups to be included. This was a great success as these people could suggest measures to improve public support for the government and they could explain to their people why certain restrictions were being introduced. [47]

The committee system was efficient and decisions were reached quickly and put into effect almost immediately so as not to lose any opportunities. The system remained basically unchanged throughout the Emergency.

* * * * * *

THE real core of the Briggs plan was re-settlement. The idea behind re-settlement was to take away the mass base of the M.C.P. and M.R.L.A.—to "take away the sea and the little fishes will soon die".

The British had realized as early as 1948 that re-settlement was a necessity and although by 1950 Negri Sembilan and Johore had made arrangements for re-settlement, [48] other States were reluctant because they did not like granting Malay land to the Chinese, as this went against the old principle of setting aside all the valuable land as Malay reservations. [49] Gurney, however, finally persuaded the Malays that preferential treatment for Malays would continue but it was essential for the future well-being of the country that the Chinese be accepted as citizens. [50] The States finally agreed and Emergency Regulation 17FA was enacted in August 1950 (although resettlement had begun in earnest earlier) and it enabled the Government to establish controlled areas in which everyone in a given area might be required to live. When this proved inadequate, Regulation 17DA was issued to enable the government to detain all persons in an area and then release and resettle those whose involvement with the terrorists was not sufficient for further detention. [51]

By the end of 1951, 400,000 people had been moved into 500 "new villages" at the cost of £11 million. [52] Roads, toilets, barbed wire fences, huts and other amenities had to be built and electricity and water had to be installed. Malaya was enjoying a rubber boom due to the Korean war, and so money was readily available but the necessary supplies and materials were not.

Resettlement officers and staff for the new villages had to be found. There were few Chinese-speaking Britons in Malaya and resettlement officers were found among civil servants on non-Emergency duty in Malaya (40 men), from civil servants learning Chinese in Macao, from among missionaries who had just returned to England after being driven out of China, and the Colonial Office was asked to train people especially for resettlement work. These men were to take charge of a new settlement, and were to train an indigenous young man, preferably a Chinese or at least a Eurasian, to take over the new settlement after a number of months when the British officer would move on to another newly-established village. The Malayan-Chinese Association helped greatly in finding many young Chinese to take over the new settlements after a period as Assistant Resettlement Officers. These men risked their lives, as they were prime targets for the terrorists. [53]

It was essential that the squatters' confidence be won. A man who spoke Chinese, knew a little of Chinese customs and the workings of the Chinese mind, whose office was always open to everybody and who was friendly, was a necessity. The ability to make friends and possession of the powers of persuasion were just as important as administrative competence. Two young British resettlement officers in Temarlok district who organized an inter-zone badminton competition between a government, police, army and new settlement team, were a good example of the type required. [54]

The average squatter in 1950 was "industrious, close fisted, lacking in civil sense, and just now, deeply bewildered". [55]

The British tried hard to be friendly to the bewildered squatters especially when they first moved them. When a group of squatters was to be moved the army and police threw in the early morning a cordon around

the area to ensure no one ran off into the jungle and also to capture any M.C.P. people who might have been spending the night in the area.

Having rounded up and taken away any suspicious persons, the British army then helped the squatters remove their belongings to the waiting trucks. The average British soldier was very pleasant and helpful in this unaccustomed role. One story tells of how after a group of British soldiers had finally rounded up one Chinese squatter family's four pigs and put all their belongings onto a waiting truck, the sergeant in charge, thinking that all was well at last bawled "let's go"!, but it turned out that the family dog had been forgotten. "To hell with the dog", the sergeant yelled, to which a young cockney conscript replied "Come on serg - didn't you ever have a dog when you were young", and then turned to his mate and said: "If the b..... ever was young." Only when the puppy was found did the lorry leave. [56]

The British made many errors initially. Sites were badly chosen and were often well away from roads and water courses and were sometimes indefensible. They had to be re-sited.

The Communists tried their utmost to disrupt the resettlement programme, as they realized its importance to them. They tried planting cells among the squatters in the new villages, fired through the wires at night, assassinated resettlement officers and their assistants and tried to dissuade the squatters from going by telling them how brutally they would be treated by the British. [57] Nevertheless not one resettled village fell to the M.C.P. [58] The M.C.P. also tried go-slow tactics by telling the squatters to tell the troops that they couldn't move until the harvest was gathered, or the pigs rounded up (perhaps the villagers in the anecdote above were told to use this trick on the British). But the government countered by compensating the squatters for the loss of a harvest or animals at market prices and not letting them delay to harvest or round-up animals. The government then either harvested the crops themselves or destroyed them.[59]

The resettlement would have been carried out regardless of whether there had been an Emergency or not because the squatters were not under any administrative control. It was just carried out in two years instead of ten because of the Emergency.

The squatters were either regrouped into more defensible positions or actually resettled into new villages. Often around mines and plantations they were regrouped inside the perimeter and the planters or mine owners were made to pay for the regroupment-much to their anger. [60]

The new settlers were compensated for resettlement and were given subsistence allowances plus a cash grant when they arrived to keep them going until they settled in. Each squatter received one-sixth of an acre of land for his shack, poultry and fruit trees, and all vegetable gardens within a two-mile radius of the perimeter of the village continued to be cultivated by their occupiers, but squatters beyond that distance were brought in and given a new plot not less than two acres and within two miles of the settlement. [61]

Shops and schools were opened in the new villages and in the schools the children were taught to regard themselves as federal citizens of a new Malaya. [62]

The British even brought in English boars to help improve breeding standards among the much smaller Malayan pigs. [63]

Both government and the M.C.P. were surprised when squatters began moving into the new settlements of their own accord. [64]

In the new villages there were still incidents and M.C.P. cells were still operative in some villages and consequently the M.R.L.A. still received food and other supplies from the new villages; but Tan Guat, a captured M.R.L.A. commander of a company in Johore, admitted that re-settlement was successful as it was hard to get food for his large gang and this restricted the types of operations they could undertake. [65] Indeed, due to the decrease in food supplies some Min Yuen and M.R.L.A. units were often forced to merge into small mobile groups. [66]

Home Guard units were formed in the new villages, numbering 120 or so men, although only 10 or 12 would be on duty in the village on any one night. This allowed a maximum number of people to be committed to the struggle. [67]

The Home Guard was established on a national basis under an Inspector-General who was a retired British Army officer and it was a police and not an army responsibility. [68] At its height there were 400 operational sections and a third of its total manpower was Chinese. [69] By the end of 1953 150 villages were protected by their own home guards and had elected their own councils to manage local affairs. The British learnt not to encourage the election of local councils until the area was pretty safe, otherwise the local councillors would be killed by the M.R.L.A. or Ming Yuen units and all the past development of building up a prosperous new village with a large measure of local management, would be destroyed and the British would have to start all over again. [70]

Briggs realized that food was still getting through to the M.R.L.A. and so tighter food controls were brought in to be used in the offending areas. In June 1951, Operation Starvation was launched and regulations to control food and supplies were introduced to prevent food, medicines and arms flowing out to the M.R.L.A. Any areas where the bandits could obtain food might be declared "food restricted areas". Lists of foods purchaseable at shops were made, and all transports carrying food on the roads had to be covered with securely tied-down tarpaulins and were not allowed to stop except within town limits. [71] All meals had to be eaten at home; no meals could be taken out of the house [72] or to work in the fields except a container of water, tea or coffee. No food except fresh fish, shell fish, fresh vegetables and fruits, live poultry and eggs could be moved along the roads at night. [73]

A 35-yard clear belt had to be kept around the perimeter fence of the village to prevent people passing food through the wire. In some areas central cooking was introduced and the people brought their own odds and ends

to add to the rice cooked at a central point in the village. This actually ensured that everyone got a square meal - often for the first time in their lives. [74] Shopkeepers had to keep full lists of their customers and their purchases and the State Governments had power to restrict the number of shops in an area and close down those no longer required. [75] Shopkeepers had to punch holes in all canned goods and rice had to be cooked in many areas as cooked rice goes bad in two days whereas non-cooked rice lasts for months.[76]

The measures were harsh but they answered the peasants question "does the government intend to win this war"? People will stand harsh measures as long as they are strictly and fairly applied to all and are seen to be effective in achieving their purpose.

Briggs told the people they now had a good excuse not to give the M.C.P. food and the M.C.P. could not very well take it out on the people. Briggs said, "you will now be able to say to the Communist extortionists when they approach you that you are no longer able to bring them food, money or other supplies." [77] Many coerced supporters of the Min Yuen took this opportunity to "opt out" of the organization.

Some still tried to get past the check points with rice in such hiding places as hollow walking sticks, bike pumps, girls bras and in the bottom of refuse carts. [78] One nine-year-old boy was caught with 5 lbs. of rice in his bicycle frame. [79] Very little got through despite the ingenious efforts to fool the Security Forces and gradually the lack of food and supplies took its effect on the M.R.L.A. and by 1957 the food control measures had been so successful that 90 per cent of serving terrorists were engaged in food gathering forays to maintain the M.R.L.A. [80]

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IN October 1951 High Commissioner Gurney was killed in an ambush and the British felt they had reached the darkest point so far in the Emergency. In November 1951 Briggs retired and the newly-elected Conservative Government in Britain appointed General Lockhart as the new Director of Operations. The death of Gurney did bring the entire question of the direction of the Malayan Emergency under scrutiny. The death shocked many British civil servants in Kuala Lumpur into realizing that there was in fact a war on and they were a lot less complacent. The new Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttleton, was sent out by Churchill to study the situation and the planters told him they would leave if the situation had not improved in six months. [81]

Lyttleton told London that law and order needed to be restored before independence, and control of the civil and military authorities must be combined so that they acted in concert.

Active co-operation with the government by the Chinese community had to be obtained before the revolt would be suppressed, [82] he stressed.

The need for a "Supremo" was realized at last, and General Sir Gerald Templer was sent out as the new High Commissioner and Military Commander-in-Chief, possessing the complete control Briggs had lacked. [83]

* * * * *

ALTHOUGH many Britons may not have realized it, the Briggs plan was working and Britain was actually winning the Emergency at the end of 1951. In the famous October 1951 Directive of the M.C.P. Central Committee, M.C.P. strategy was changed. The M.C.P. realized they were not winning friends and influencing people by burning people's homes, slashing their rubber trees or by throwing grenades into packed cinemas. A list of targets was given and from now on only stubborn reactionaries, traitors, British and Gurhka prisoners, British mine and plantation managers, resettlement officers, policemen and Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist) members were to be killed. The Trade Unions were also to be infiltrated. This new policy overtly admitted that the policy of 1948, i.e. to capture Malaya by guerrilla warfare, had failed and that the M.C.P. must gradually return to its earlier programme of political and economic action.

M.R.L.A. units split up into even smaller units and from now on policed posts were never attacked by more than 20 to 30 terrorists. Police losses dropped dramatically from 100 a month in 1951 to 20 by the middle of 1952 and were never to rise above that figure again. The number of civilian deaths also decreased in roughly the same proportions. [84]

This was the reward for efficient population control and breaking up the big units. This was the legacy of the Briggs Plan.

Templer realized the Briggs Plan with minor modifications, such as merging the F.W.C. into the F.E.C. as he felt it was impossible to divorce the Emergency side of the government from the normal peaceful process. [85] Such action was part of his plan to make the civil and Emergency sides of government one. On his arrival he stressed this clearly when he said that "there is no-one who is not affected in his daily life by the Emergency. Any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly inter-related." [86]

Templer's objectives were to defeat militant Communism in a military campaign but at the same time to defeat Communism at its source in a social and political campaign which would prepare the country for self-government within the Commonwealth.

Templer brought with him to Malaya the British Government's assurance that Malaya would become independent once the M.C.P. was defeated. He was determined to bring self-government to Malaya, but not until the Malayan government was strong enough to prevent racial violence and the people were secure and reasonably prosperous. He realized the people preferred good government rather than self-government but where possible he encouraged them to elect their own local bodies to be responsible for their local affairs, and regulations were

passed to enable such local councils to be formed.[87] There were two reasons for this. One was that self-government begins at the bottom; and the second reason was to enlist the support of the Chinese villagers by making them feel that they had something worth fighting for. It was part of "winning the hearts and minds of the people".

Templer tried desperately to get the Chinese actively on his side; but his success was limited. When he formed the Federation Regiment in July of 1952 81 per cent of the volunteers were Malays and when conscription of the Chinese into one of the police or military services (including the Home Guard) was begun many young Chinese left for overseas to avoid being conscripted. [88]

With the Home Guard, Templer was instrumental in ensuring that at least one-third of its strength was Chinese.

In Malay Kampongs the Home Guard could be trusted to look after its own defence and this released the police for other duties. The M.C.P. knew it could expect no help from the Malays, but Templer also began to trust the Chinese Home Guard more and more too. He took a risk and the Chinese guardsmen were given access to weapons, were trained how to use them and in 1953 were even given some armoured cars and were trained in the technique of commanding fighting soldiers. The risk paid dividends and in 1953 the Home Guard was re-organized and one in three units were armed. Home Guard units often showed pluck in fighting marauders and the vast majority of them upheld the trust placed in them. [89] In some areas, the Home Guard was even put wholly in command of the defence of the local area and morale soared higher as a result. [90]

However in most Chinese areas, Malay police were still stationed among the people and to improve relations between the police and the Chinese villagers. "Operation Service" was introduced by Colonel Young, the new Police Commissioner, and the police were educated to see themselves as friends of the people in the villages rather than as their enemies. The police as a result became a lot more friendly and helpful towards the Chinese population. [91]

Templer could be tough when he felt the need called for strong action as he showed during the Tamjong Malin incident, when the M.R.L.A. ambushed and killed Michael Codner of "Wooden Horse" fame and eleven policemen while they were examining a blown pipeline near the town. [92]

The town had been a very bad area and no one volunteered any information as to who was responsible for this particular ambush. [93] Templer went to the town and berated the villagers telling them that "You want everything done for you, but you are not prepared to assume the responsibility of citizenship." [94] He then imposed a 22-hour curfew, cut the rice ration to the bare minimum and then provided information papers on which the people were to write the names of any persons they believed or suspected to be Min Yuen supporters. These papers were put into sealed boxes which Templer personally opened. Forty suspects were arrested and the restrictions were lifted and the district became one of the safest areas in Malaya with a Home Guard of 3,500. The local M.R.L.A. unit moved on and split up into smaller units.[94] By such stern action Templer showed that the government meant business, and although the initial action to punish the villagers was harsh, as soon as they did what was required of them, they were rewarded and praised.

* * * * *

IN September 1953 Templer tried a novel new approach. He took a calculated gamble and established Malaya's first "White Area" in a 22-square mile area of the Malaccan coast which contained 160,000 persons. [95] A "White Area" was a district which had been free of Communist activity for a long period of time and where the people had proven themselves by helping the police. Special Branch decided when the time was ripe to declare an area "White" and once declared "White", food control, curfews and all the other Emergency restrictions were lifted within the "White" area. [96] Templer told the Malaccan people "It is the job of everyone to keep the Communists out. Refuse them supplies and report their presence at once to the police if they do come back".[97] The move was a success, and five months later a terrorist foraging party was reported in the area and was successfully ambushed. [98]

In the next six years White Areas were gradually extended over all Malaya and once an area was declared "White" and free of the Communists, the people were quite prepared to report any Communist activity so as to keep the area "White" and free of the government restrictions and Communist intimidation.

Templer travelled around Malaya meeting people and assessing developments on the spot throughout his stay in Malaya. His personal staff of four representing the police, army, civil service and air force, also travelled around the country and reported back to him. They were able to make decisions or accept actions on behalf of the Director of Operations (Templer was also Director of Operations as well as High Commissioner) on any problem because they collectively represented the composition of the D.O.C. itself. This system assured a quick response to new developments. [99]

It may seem that Templer was himself a British counter-insurgency "tactic" and perhaps, in a way, he was in that he was a dynamic, forceful "Supremo" who was placed in command at the right stage of the Insurgency. He prosecuted the Briggs plan enthusiastically and perhaps his greatest drive was exerted in the area of progress towards self-government. It was a most important part of overall British strategy that Malaya progress steadily towards self-government and Templer instilled a new attitude in the minds of all people in Malaya.

He broke from the old Imperial custom of the British High Commissioners when he shook the hands of all of the forty servants lined up to greet him when he arrived at his residence in February 1952. [100] He also caused the racist committee of the all-white "Lake Club" in Kuala Lumpur to resign and the new committee agreed to a

multi-racial membership. [101] He poured scorn on the European community for their complacency and racialism. [102] He prepared for an independent Malaya by firstly breaking down such entrenched British Imperial attitudes.

Apart from the ever-growing presence of Malays, both in the legislature and the administration, Templer enabled the Chinese to become citizens of Malaya by passing a common Malayan Citizenship law in 1952. Chinese, often ex-terrorists, were sent to expound to the New Villages the necessity of becoming part of the country. [103]

National primary schools were set up under the Briggs plan and developed further under Templer. The children were taught to think of themselves as Malayans rather than as Malays, Chinese or Indians.

Templer's measures were successful but the Chinese were still generally loath openly to support the government by joining the fighting services. They did not seem to mind volunteering for such civilian posts as liaison officer and Assistant Re-settlement Officer, but it was not until 1957 or so when the war was won that they realized that to help the government wipe out the remaining terrorists was the quickest way to achieve peace and security. It seems they were very careful indeed in waiting until it was obvious who was to win, and all the goodwill in the world would do little to persuade them to help the government until it was obvious the government would win. As it turned out, the British needed only marginal Chinese active support and benevolent neutrality from the rest, as the Malays who comprised 49 per cent of the population, were already committed to the Government side. [104]

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TEMPLER was replaced in 1954 by his deputy, Sir Donald MacGillivray, as High Commissioner and General Bourne became Director of Operations. This was a reversion to the pre-1952 position but the war was going so well it was felt this could be done with safety. Templer's last statement to a cheering Legislative Council was that the British Government no longer regarded the Communist threat as a bar to the introduction of parliamentary elections or the achievement of Malayan independence. [105]

Before drawing some conclusions about the British methods used in the Emergency, a few aspects of counter-insurgency tactics must be mentioned. The first is in relation to the aborigines.

In 1952 as the M.R.L.A. withdrew further into the interior, it was feared that the M.C.P. would establish liberated areas among the timid aborigines who inhabited Malaya's interior mountain spine. To prevent the M.C.P. using the aborigines as a source of food, the government sent out teams (usually special air servicemen and police) to win over these aborigines who numbered between 50,000 to 100,000 according to the various authorities. Landing strips were made and police posts were established in these remote areas to protect the aborigines from the M.C.P. and the interior was gradually taken over by the government. For the aborigines it meant a quicker means of getting their goods to market and it also meant medical care and attention which was regarded as most welcome by these jungle dwellers.

A small aborigine force, called the *Senoi Pra'ak* was formed to harass the communists and this force killed more terrorists in the last two years of the Emergency than all the other Security Forces put together. [106] Jungle forts and aborigine patrols and scouts also crisscrossed the Thai border area and reported on M.C.P. activity there. This surveillance and the occasional ambushing of M.R.L.A. units infiltrating into Malaya helped keep those members of the M.C.P. in Thailand on the Thai side of the border. [107]

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ONE topic barely touched upon, but which is the cornerstone of any successful counter-insurgency or insurgency is Intelligence. The British had to get information regarding Communist units and Min Yuen supporters before it could effectively ambush M.R.L.A. units or capture Min Yuen members. In the jungle 25 per cent of the contacts made with the M.R.L.A. were chance contacts and the remaining 75 per cent were the result of Intelligence. [108] This gives some indication of the importance of Intelligence.

Intelligence in Malaya was basically the preserve of Special Branch, which was a branch of the police with its British director at the Federal Police headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. At the grass–roots level, where it counted most, the officers were Chinese–hand picked men who lived at the local police post. These men, often young Chinese college graduates, [109] were the target of assassination by the Communists and their posts were the target of M.C.P. penetration. The Special Branch had a plain clothes man in every Chinese village of any size. [110]

Until the time when New Villages were established, British Intelligence was very poor as the Administration could not give adequate protection to anyone who came forward to volunteer information. On the other hand, the M.R.L.A. had up until re-settlement very good Intelligence.

Even with re-settlement, although the task of the Special Branch officer was made a lot easier, few people came forward despite the huge rewards offered for the successful capture or killing of terrorists and the greater security offered to the informer, and so Special Branch engaged in a cloak and dagger game of gradually recruiting agents from among the Min Yuen organization. The idea here was to infiltrate the local branch by means of recruiting supporters of the local Min Yuen organization who had usually been coerced into joining the Min Yuen in the first place. [111] These coerced Min Yuen supporters were usually only too glad to get out of the Min Yuen. The agents Special Branch detached from the local Min

Yuen were trusted members of the local organization and were thus able to tell the government what the Min Yuen and local M.R.L.A. planned to do in the immediate future. Agents were often blackmailed by Special Branch into working for the government, otherwise they would be charged with helping the enemy.[112]

The agent was usually old, infirm or had a family or a small business to worry about, as otherwise there was always the danger that when pressed or blackmailed by the Special Branch man to become an agent, he would run off into the jungle to join the M.R.L.A. so as not to be prosecuted by the government or risk betraying the local Min Yuen.[113] If he had a family or some other compelling reason to stay he knew he had to take the job and once "hooked" he would work with ever-increasing vigour and cunning to wipe out the local terrorist branch members and local Min Yuen, for as long as they remained alive they posed a threat to his life if they ever discovered that he was a government agent. Once the job was done, he would usually take his family and his reward and start a new life in Hong Kong, Thailand or Sarawak under a different name.[114]

Special Branch played a delicate role. A successful ambush would increase local confidence and lead to an increase in information offered to the government. A botched ambush would lead to silence and the agent would be useless in future as he would be too terrified to help the government again. It was essential that co-ordination and co-operation between the local Special Branch man and the local army commander was good, otherwise ambushes would be botched.

The information of Special Branch agents led to many successful ambushes of M.R.L.A. units, usually at secret food storage places and on jungle paths near the villages. The most spectacular result of information given by an agent was the death of Goh Peng Tuan and 12 of his 20 comrades camped in the jungle in Kluang by a pinpoint air raid by Lincoln bombers. The agent involved, a fellow named Arthur, wanted to buy a gold toothpick (among other things) with the reward money.[115]

Colonel Miers may not have had a high opinion of these agents but he readily admitted their importance in the struggle when he rather arrogantly admitted that he was sick of the "....frustration of dealing with the wretched little informers, their blatant ignorance aggravated by a low cunning; the maddening vexation of waiting on their whims, their suspicions and their fears and yet knowing that without the information they supply the country can never be cleansed of terrorism."[116]

The other major source of information Special Branch had was from surrendered enemy personnel (S.E.P's). Indeed from information gathered from Special Branch agents, S.E.P's and from other sources of information, gathered by the Security Forces, Special Branch had compiled files and dossiers which by 1953 contained the names and photographs of most of the M.R.L.A. and M.C.P. members.[117] These files and dossiers were kept at the District Police Station in each district.

S.E.P's provided much of the information that led to the capture or killing off of the M.R.L.A. and its units. Many S.E.P's after becoming disillusioned with the M.R.L.A. took the first opportunity to leave the jungle. S.E.P's often felt they had been betrayed by the M.C.P. which had caused them to waste the best years of their life under strict discipline in the jungle, fighting for a cause that had little popular appeal and which was losing. They felt resentment against their unit leaders and such feelings, plus the fact that they knew their erstwhile comrades would kill them if they ever found out they had voluntarily surrendered, made it logical to them to lead the British back to the jungle camp to obliterate their ex-comrades.[118]

Once it was obvious Britain was winning the war, the number of S.E.P's increased greatly and in all 2,702 surrendered, mostly in the last few years of the Emergency.[119]

The S.E.P's were aware by the mid-1950s that they would be treated well and not prosecuted if they voluntarily surrendered and co-operated with the authorities.[120] Indeed, the British would even classify a captured guerrilla as a S.E.P. if there was the least spark of co-operation.[121]

Thanks to Voice Aircraft flying over the jungle and broadcasting terms of surrender and rewards, and RAF drops of leaflets setting out the terms (and also often carrying a picture of a thin emaciated S.E.P. at the time of surrender and the same fellow fat and happy a month later) and constituting in itself a safe conduct pass, the potential S.E.P. was informed of what he could expect if he surrendered.

The S.E.P. was especially tempted by the huge rewards offered if he surrendered and led the British back to his old camp or alternatively, if he brought in a party of terrorists to surrender with him (a sort of special "group price" for the S.E.P. showing such initiative). Rewards varied from £30,000 for Chin Peng to £250 for an ordinary non-ranking bandit.[122] The S.E.P. received half of this if he brought in his comrades or led the British back to his camp. The rewards were more than the average plantation worker, peasant or mine labourer could make in a life-time. It was often criticized by government officials as being a rather unfair system as a hard-working Malay policeman would never earn as much as would a S.E.P. who either brought in some of his friends or led the British to his camp. However, the results justified the expense. It would have been a thousand times more expensive to capture terrorists by huge useless army operations in the jungle. The reward system was cheap in comparison and the results were often spectacular. In 1952 for instance, the dreaded "Shorty" Kut's bodyguard brought in Shorty's head (literally) and claimed the £20,000.[123]

In 1957 Hor Lung, a M.C.P. politburo member and officer commanding the Southern Region of the M.R.L.A. since 1953, surrendered and agreed to bring in his entire area group for £55,000. In all 183 insurgents were rounded up by Hor Lung and his escort of British soldiers who took six months to visit all the camps in the area. This

action broke the back of the M.R.L.A. in the southern half of Malaya and it was six months after the round up was completed before the M.C.P. realized it had no men in that large area of Johore, whitewashed by Hor Lung and the British.[124] Around this time the British were beginning to crack the M.C.P's jungle letter-box system and the security forces simply followed the courier back to his camp or to the camp he was going to and arrested everyone there. The co-operation of S.E.P's like Hor Lung who knew the location of all the letter-boxes in an area was invaluable.

The capture or elimination of a feared local guerrilla leader had a tremendous effect upon the morale of the local population and information began to flow more freely and this, coupled with the intelligence gained from the leader (if he surrendered or was captured) himself had a cumulative effect in that it often resulted in an important lead into neighbouring units.

As more and more terrorists became isolated from their branch or District Headquarters they wandered about the jungle, starved of food and information and were that much more easy to capture or eliminate. This was the effect of cutting the M.C.P. lines of communication and capturing or destroying several units in an area.

Once the Briggs plan had resulted in the squatters being resettled and Special Branch being able to operate more efficiently, the information gained from agents and informers and S.E.P's, enabled the Security Forces to mop up over a period of time all the M.R.L.A. units in Malaya. From 1951 onwards it was indeed a Special Branch war.

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THE British had an immediate advantage over the M.C.P. in 1948 as they had a functioning, administrative structure operating at all levels of government right down to village level where the government was usually represented by the local police post. The fact that the British always trained indigenes to serve in the Civil Services of the colonies meant that there were local people capable of running the Civil Service when the British finally left. Indeed, even in 1939 ten per cent of the Malayan Civil Service consisted of Malays and this proportion was greater still by 1948.[125] This, plus the fact that the Malay States shared the administration of all matters except religion and custom (over which they had full jurisdiction) and also that the Executive and Legislative Councils were made up mainly of Asians under the Federation Agreement of 1948, meant that there were Malays, some Chinese and even a few Indians to be seen in the administration of the country.[126]

Throughout the Emergency the British built on this solid foundation and with Malayan leaders like Tunku Abdul Rahman emerging from university and entering politics or the professions, Malaya had a group of people capable of taking over the administration of the country by 1957, and the British could be seen to be gradually letting the "natives" have more and more say and control over their own destiny.

In 1955 the Tunku's Alliance Party took over the government of the country, winning 51 out of 52 elected seats in the 98-seat Legislative Council, and after "Merdeka" the "liberation" plank was knocked completely from under the M.C.P. which wilted at an even faster rate as a result. [127]

Thus a strong administrative structure and a definite progress towards independence in an orderly and democratic manner were pillars of British counter-insurgency policy. It took 30 years to educate the Malayans, starting in the 1920s for the Civil Service, government and professions, but the effort was worth it and made the Emergency that much easier to win.

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IN concluding it can be said that in many ways the Malayan Emergency was typical of the British way of fighting terrorists. The British "way" is to keep the campaign within the rule of law, with the legal system operating as closely as possible to its normal peace-time operation but with certain statutory modifications to combat the Insurgency. Under such a system everyone knows where he stands and the army is called in to aid the civil power, not to rule the country by martial law; if a soldier shot a civilian or even a captured terrorist in cold blood as the French and Americans sometimes did in Vietnam, he would be charged with murder under the normal criminal law. Although the British did behave badly and contrary to such rules in South Africa during the Boer War and on the North-West Frontier in India, they strictly complied with the rule of law in Malaya.

When operating under the rule of law, the government itself was responsible to the people and could be taken to court if it abused its powers under the law. The law also puts the government in a position where it is represented as a protector of those who are innocent and it puts the terrorists in the position of criminals. The civil law functioned normally throughout the Emergency.[127]

It is accepted by many today that a guerrilla struggle is a contest in government and if this is so, the law is most important. A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and it cannot expect the people to obey its laws. The law must also be effective and be seen to work. It must also be strictly enforced and apply equally to all. If this is done, the people will tolerate even harsh laws as they can see the effect the law is having and more importantly, they know that it is affecting everyone else in the same way as it is affecting themselves.

It was the rule of law which was probably the most important method of fighting the insurgents in Malaya. All the tactics employed by the British to defeat the Insurgency were allied to it and indeed were developed in accordance with it.

The single most important measure the British introduced in Malaya was resettlement as it caused the M.R.L.A. to wither and die. It split the M.R.L.A. from its Min Yuen and mass base and allied with other mea-

sures such as population control, food rationing, curfews and check point controls it deprived the M.R.L.A. of food, supplies, many potential recruits and much information. Resettlement was so successful that after the Emergency the majority of the 500 - 600,000 squatters resettled in 500 or more new villages, stayed in their resettled areas, some of which were indeed model villages.

Co-ordination of effort is another lesson we can learn from the Malayan Emergency. It was largely due to the efficient system the British gradually built up that enabled quick decisions to be made as to plans of action to counter any development that might arise. Every branch of government had its set duties and responsibilities within the unified system of effort and once the overlaps of authority were smoothed out the system ran very efficiently. One need only look at South Vietnam in the early 1960's to see how chaotic the situation can become where there is no co-ordination of effort.

The fact that the British Army was able to prevent the M.R.L.A. from establishing secure base areas in the jungle is also most important. Indeed the constant pressure exerted by the Security Forces kept the M.R.L.A. on the move and helped force it to break into smaller units to avoid unwanted encounters. The jungle was therefore denied to the enemy as a safe refuge.

It is obvious from the Malayan Emergency that a population must feel secure before it will contemplate giving information. It was not until 1957 that many Chinese felt safe enough to give information, and this fact raises the point that with a basically neutral population, the government forces will not achieve large-scale support from the people until the people are secure and it is obvious the government is winning.

Many people have said that the British Counter-Insurgency methods were too slow in achieving the desired effect and that, given a limited number of terrorists, their limited popular base and their lack of a friendly neighbour (Thailand was anti-Communist and from 1949 onwards allowed Malayan police to pursue M.R.L.A. units across the border) the British should have won the "war" earlier than they did.

It can be seen that the British methods were slow but successful. The British had a good understanding of their enemy and the tactics that were needed to defeat him and they applied these tactics slowly but methodically. Even after British tactics and strategy were finally settled in 1952 the British still moved slowly and cautiously and, I believe, this is the only way to fight an Insurgency. No insurgency or guerrilla war is spectacular. It is a slow process on either side. The insurgents try slowly to erode the government and the government, proceeding with caution, tries slowly to erode the insurgent organization. This is what the British did and the effect of British tactics and methods was the disintegration of the M.C.P. structure and organization in Malaya. It is true that Chin Peng has, even today, over 500 men in southern Thailand but he withdrew these hard-core supporters to Thailand because he knew he had lost the Malayan Emergency.

In June 1960 when the Emergency was ended officially all that remained of the M.R.L.A. in Malaya were 20 or 30 ragged, starving men, begging food from sympathetic aborigines to stay alive.[128]

This was the final effect of British counter-insurgency methods in Malaya and was as complete a victory as one could reasonably expect in a war of this kind.

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14. The "Specials", as they were called, were formed up into area security units of some 35 men, *Ibid.*, p. 83.
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23. *Malaysia - Selected Historical Readings* (Federation of Malaya Year Book, Vol. 1, Kuala Lumpur, 1962), p. 368.
24. Paget, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
25. *The Federation of Malaya - Annual Report, 1950* (Kuala Lumpur, 1951), p. 160.
26. Up till 1950, 86,538 ID cards were destroyed by the MCP (1950 Federal Yearbook, *op. cit.*, p. 160).
27. Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
28. Federal Year Book, *op. cit.*, p. 368.
29. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
30. Federal Year Book, *op. cit.*, p. 368.
31. Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
32. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
33. *Ibid.*
34. "Anti-bandit month" was held from 28 February to 2 April 1950 and 500,000 volunteers helped police screen the population and man road blocks in response to a call for help from the police (The Federation of Malaya Annual Report, 1950, *op. cit.*, p. 2).
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50. Indeed, 148,000 Chinese did register (by application) and received Malayan citizenship during 1949-50 (Federal Year Book, 1950, p. 24).
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56. Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 262. Paget, *op. cit.*, p. 58, mentions that one new village called itself "Kampong Coldstream" in recognition of the help the villagers had received from the Coldstream Guards.
57. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
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60. Paget, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
61. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Ibid.*
65. *Ibid.*
66. Federal Year Book, 1950, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
67. McCuen, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
69. It must be remembered that although 85 per cent of all persons settled were Chinese, only one-third of the Home Guards' total manpower was Chinese. This is indicative of the lack of active participation in the struggle by the Chinese.
70. McCuen, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
71. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Ibid.*
74. McCuen, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

75. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
76. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 144.
77. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
78. Paget, *op. cit.*, p. 68. During "Operation Hubbard" in Negri Sembilan, manpower resources were so stretched in operating check-points that the Army, Police, civilians and even the British Adviser and the Malay State Secretary took turns in manning them.
79. Miers, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
80. Paget, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
81. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
82. Mills, *Malaya* (Univ. of Minnesota, Minneapolis 1958), p. 61.
83. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
84. Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
85. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 205.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
87. Federal Year Book, 1962, *op. cit.*
88. Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
89. Paget, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
90. *Ibid.*
91. Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
92. Paget, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
93. In the first three months of 1952 there had been 67 incidents and thousands of slashed trees reported. In this period information was given to the authorities on only three occasions (Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 209).
94. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
95. *Ibid.*, p 224.
96. Paget, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
97. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 224.
98. *Ibid.*
99. Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 83.
100. Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
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104. 1945 and 1952 Census Figures (McCuen, *op. cit.*, p. 166).
105. Federal Year Book, 1962, *op. cit.*, p. 321.
106. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 153.
107. *Ibid.*
108. Miers, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
109. Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
110. *Ibid.*
111. *Ibi d.*, p. 91.
112. With the strict Food and Supply Controls introduced along with resettlement, only the dedicated or desperate supporters of the local Min Yuen organization would risk smuggling supplies to the M.R.L.A., and the Special Branch man would watch a likely suspect for a while and would take incriminating photographs of him in such acts as putting rice into concealed hiding places for the M.R.L.A. to pick up later. The wretched fellow would then be presented with the evidence and persuaded to help the Government (Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 98).
113. *Ibid.*
114. *Ibid.*
115. Miers, *op. cit.*, p. 77
116. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
117. E. O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
120. A good example of one of the more successful offers was the "Merdeka Offer" of August 1957, which offered amnesty for all crimes committed under Communist direction if the S.E.P. co-operated (Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 105).
121. It is well to note that the potential S.E.P. took a great risk in picking up a leaflet in the jungle as the M.C.P. rule was that a man caught reading a dropped leaflet would be executed (Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 103).
122. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
123. Barber, *op. cit.*,
124. E. O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
125. Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
126. *Ibid.*
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128. Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

SOUTH VIETNAM: *The January cease-fire agreement has not deflected the Vietnamese Communists from their objective of seizing power in the South. Now that the U.S. forces have gone, Hanoi's strategists are likely to be pre-occupied with finding the most effective level of overt North Vietnamese military action to support the fomenting of subversion and insurgency in the South by the indigenous Viet Cong (VC).*



Vietnam a year after the Spring/Summer offensive

Vo Truong Son

THE 1972 Spring/Summer Campaign launched by Hanoi and its Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), seen from an overall strategic standpoint was considered by them as a *Dong Khoi*[1] similar in nature to the one in 1960.

Throughout the twelve months of hostility since April 1972, the Communist campaign in the Mekong Delta has involved an organized "spontaneous uprising" with a "three prongs" offensive[2] giving primary emphasis to military proselytizing.

Very few observers have drawn attention to the importance of military proselytizing. There are two main reasons for this: firstly, they have been mainly concerned with large battles in An Loc, Quang Tri, Kontum, which to a large degree were designed to act as leverages for the rural campaign. They missed a primary ambition of the 1972 offensive, namely, the disruption of the entire structure of South Vietnamese armed forces and the Pacification programme, especially in the Mekong Delta, through a "spontaneous uprising". Secondly, once the COSVN military proselytizing effort failed after 12 months of vigorous action, it left little trace on the field and surprisingly showed no psychological impact on the South Vietnamese armed forces.

The land grabbing campaign, immediately after the cease-fire came into effect, to which observers have paid so much attention, was essentially planned to be the climax of the *Dong Khoi* campaign. In consequence, it inherited all the merits and weakness of the latter and in turn gave an indication of Communist prospects in the half-military-half-political struggle which would follow the cease-fire. The signing of the cease-fire did not in any way affect the Communist's long-sought and ultimate objective, which in their terminology is "to defeat the American and Puppet government, leading to the establishment of the proletarian regime".

The problem the Communists now face is how this objective is going to be realized in view of both the January Paris Peace Agreement, which defined the terms under which a peaceful political solution is supposed to be worked out, and the seemingly irreconcilable differences that continue to exist between the objectives of the two age-old enemies.

It is quite clear that their organization on the ground is not as good as they hoped. This is shown by the failure of their military proselytizing effort during last year's campaign. The general aim of military proselytizing is to disrupt and, if possible, dismantle the enemy's armed forces and to sever his supply of manpower from the population. The Communists last year, therefore, set out to demoralize and shatter the fighting spirit of soldiers in all kinds of South Vietnamese armed units, including the Regional Forces and Peoples Self Defence Forces.[3] They attempted to encourage draft-dodging and to incite and persuade soldiers to revolt and kill their commanders once the uprising was in full swing. They put an enormous amount of careful preparation into this military proselytizing effort well in advance of the start of the "uprising". It was clearly a major element in the entire plan.

But it failed badly. The Communist planners set targets and tasks well beyond the capabilities of their cadre organization. They had been given over-optimistic assessments of the abilities of their proselytizing network. These came from subordinates striving to please higher authorities. The main weakness was not so much the number of agents they had been able to recruit and place within the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, but their quality. When called upon to act in unison with the Viet Cong/National Liberation Front (VC/NLF) during the uprising – for example by killing their commanders – they failed to respond.

The inadequate quality and performance of the local military proselytizing cadre network is typical of the general state and quality of the VC cadre organization or infrastructure throughout the country. Since 1968 it has deteriorated badly.

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PARTLY because of such failures, the 1972's *Dong Khoi* campaign after nine months of vigorous fighting was largely crushed. At best, it had the effect of reducing the boundaries of the pacification programme in a number of areas in the Mekong Delta. But apart from this meagre effect, it failed to build up a psychological and military momentum as a leverage in support of the political struggle after the cease-fire.

The ultimate aim of Hanoi's total offensive was to force the United Stated and South Vietnam in a US election year to accept a cease-fire on terms favourable to North Vietnam. However, with the devastating B-52 air strikes in late December 1972, the US managed to force Hanoi to accept a cease-fire in which the political issue remained unsolved, and the military position of Hanoi in South Vietnam was not improved. In other words, Hanoi had to accept an unsatisfactory cease-fire from its viewpoint. The future now entirely depends on the relative military strength of each side. This is tantamount to claiming that the situation in South Vietnam remained essentially unchanged after the agreement. The fighting goes on. That was the true value of the Paris Peace Agreement. What the US gained was the return of all her prisoners-of-war. What North Vietnam gained was to escape the destruction of the air war. But as far as the Indochinese, especially the South Vietnamese, War was concerned, the Paris Peace Agreement only reflected the relative strength of each side, and made no attempt to change it.

After the cease-fire, North Vietnam had, in many respects, to return to the starting point of its conquest of South Vietnam initiated 13 years ago. The reality of the land-grabbing campaign served to illustrate this.

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COSVN, under Hanoi's instruction, had no other choice than to carry out its land-grabbing campaign, since the Paris Peace Agreement, in contrast to the Geneva 1954 Accords, created thousands of ill-defined "17th Parallels" which under fluid conditions, changed constantly depending on advances or retreats by either side everyday, every hour and every minute.

There were two major strategic objectives in COSVN's land-grabbing campaign. First of all, after the cease-fire it was of utmost importance to seize a prosperous village or an important road in every district. These were considered the equivalent of a South Vietnamese Government (GVN) district town. In every province, a suburb or an important market place was to be seized. With these places, COSVN hoped to gain favourable terms at the bargaining table in the three-sided National Council of Reconciliation and Concord,[4] as well as to impress the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) with regard to their territorial control.

Secondly, COSVN strongly demanded their forces to control quickly National Route 4 (running along the backbone of the Mekong Delta) within four or five days. If conditions permitted, they were required to control it long enough to cut off the line of relief between the upper and lower halves of the Delta.

Tactically speaking, partly on account of the great number of targets marked by the above strategic drive, and partly because COSVN wanted to hide their open act of violation of the cease-fire agreement, the Communist forces were spread out thinly. Even the major regular units were dispersed into small units of platoon and squad size, burying their heavy weapons and equipments, and using only B-40 rockets and personal weapons, in pursuit of guerrilla acts of warfare. As their earlier large-scale, armed actions had not brought victory but heavy losses, they found it necessary to go to considerable length to disguise their intentions. They dispersed their troops, moved them about, changed their code numbers and lay low waiting for opportunities for surprise actions.

The land-grabbing campaign included the three aspects of military proselytizing, armed action and civilian (political) proselytizing. Those three aspects could not be separated from each other. The success or failure of any of them would have a decisive effect on the whole Communist strategy of violent seizure of power.

At the outset of the campaign, the Communists had the upper hand since they took the initiative with offensive actions. The people as well as GVN forces, generally speaking, did no more than react to these offensives. They carried out only defensive or relief operations. It is on account of this initiative that in the first few days after the cease-fire, hundreds of hamlets fell to the Communists. Throughout the country at least 10 per cent of "secured" villages became "contested" villages as defined in terms of the relative duration of activity by either side within one day.

The terms of the definition are roughly as follows:

In a contested village: the Communists are active from 8 p.m. until 6 a.m. next day (10 hours at night). The GVN are active from 6 a.m. until 8 p.m. (14 hours).

In a relatively unsecured village: the Communists are active from 1 a.m. until 4 a.m. (3 hours at night).

In a secured village: the Communists are completely expelled from the hamlets.

To achieve such initial and temporary victories, COSVN had to pay a very high cost. According to report 261 by the Communist Zone 2 (consisting of Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, Long An, Chau Doc and part of Kien Giang provinces) to COSVN, the

Communist losses in manpower and weapons in the first two days after the cease-fire (28 – 29 January) were equivalent to those in July and August 1972-the two months of heaviest fighting in the Mekong Delta last year.

Most bitter of all, with such heavy losses, the Communists failed to maintain what they hastily grabbed (in violation of the cease-fire agreement signed by themselves) and gradually were forced to withdraw from the contested areas. Even a number of "key liberated areas" gradually slipped out of Communist hands. Re-established GVN outposts and their relief activities turned some of these "liberated" areas into dangerous terrain for Communist liaison and rear service units. This affected their general troop movements.

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WHILE the Communist military proselytizing and armed offensives were beaten, so was the civilian proselytizing offensive. Going deeper into the matter, one found that the causes of the failures were more important than the failures themselves.

A high-ranking Communist cadre at zone level explained why the Communists had failed to motivate the people to stage an uprising, and were unable to persuade the rural population to follow the NLF to the "liberated" areas.

Question: Why did not the rural population respond to the appeal for an uprising when, on the first few days of the 1972's *Dong Khoi*, the NLF occupied most of the 20/7 area?[5]

Answer: In my opinion, it is very difficult to assess the people's mentality and political attitude. The rural population today are well taught about the rules of this war. That is, either side may win and lose successively, being victor in one moment, then loser the next moment. Today this area is "liberated", tomorrow it may become controlled by the enemy, and this is quite normal and universal in Vietnam. This explains why the people are very reserved about temporary victories. They are realistically thinking people. In the 1960 s *Dong Khoi* (uprising) people vested all their "religious" faith in victory for the NLF, and the victory did not materialize. In the 1968 Tet offensive, victory seemed to be at hand, then it turned sour.

Thus, in receiving the 1972 *Dong Khoi*, despite the NLF's expressed determination to win great victories, the masses and even the Communist soldiers remained poorly responsive to the appeal. They saw that victory and defeat in an offensive merely reflect temporary conditions on the battlefield. As a result it is extremely difficult to incite and mobilize people into a mass uprising...

A second cause of the failure in civilian proselytizing was the loss of popular sympathy. In *"Tu Dong Bang Cuu Long Den Hoa Dam Ba Le"* ("From the Mekong Delta to the Paris Peace Talks") edited by the National College Magazine (No 29), November 1972, this writer remarked that when the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces first arrived in the Mekong Delta, they paid special attention to civilian proselytizing to win over the people's hearts, and they were remarkably successful. But this did not last long. Conflicts began to develop between NVA units and the local people for a number of reasons. First of all, the NVA soldiers lacked the local relationship embedded in the feeling of kinship, neighbourhood and togetherness cultivated and identified by dialects and mores and manners. Secondly, they did not care much about protecting the property of the people. They often built their combat trenches inside people's houses or gardens and this way of fighting invited bombing and shelling which often devastated the people's dwellings. Occasionally, NVA soldiers unintentionally threw grenades into trenches, killing civilians indiscriminately, often because they failed to carefully investigate the location of civilians and the enemy. NVA soldiers disturbed rural life by picking fruit from private garden trees. This sort of irritant still goes on.

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FROM the military point of view, the Communist failure in the Delta during last year's campaign stemmed from tactical causes. NVA units, applying regular tactics, often tasted bitter defeat. The Z18 Regiment, for instance, suffered heavy losses without gaining any compensatory successes because it did not employ local cadres, local liaison units, or local rear-service units, but carried out its operations based on map and regular techniques, as well as its own built-in rear-service units. The Z14 Regiment, a most capable unit, on the other hand was more successful because it employed localized fighting tactics, using local cadres in its command staff.

Moreover, the dispersion of large units into small units in offensives against a large number of targets denied the Communists numerical superiority in most cases. As a result, they failed to make any spectacular headway, exposed themselves to decimation and destruction by GVN forces. The thinning out of regular units also denied to the Communists their well-versed manoevrability of regular units and forced them to accept guerrilla tactics not well-known to young NVA soldiers.

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IN the wake of the land grabbing campaign, COSVN issued on 17 February 1973 a directive to be studied by all Party members in South Vietnam with regard to the struggle in the post-cease-fire period.

This Directive had been disseminated to cadres of zone and province level to be studied and developed into Task Resolutions for application in each province in the

period up to June 1973, possibly in preparation for another major offensive.

This Directive was of utmost importance, as it developed an immediate overall strategy for the Communists in South Vietnam after the defeat of their land-grabbing campaign. On the other hand, Regional Directives as well as Provincial Resolutions exposed concrete details about difficulties and shortcomings facing COSVN at this strategically important time. It is possible to say that COSVN is caught in a dilemma, for there is as yet no sign of a definite, new policy from Hanoi. From an analysis of the February Directive in the light of the general situation all over the country, particularly in the Mekong Delta, one can draw a number of important conclusions.

The Directive consisted of three main parts.

Part I. This aimed at boosting the morale of the NLF cadres and soldiers once it was clear that the January Paris Agreement had not given the Communists what they had claimed in October 1972 to have won from the US. The Directive also attempted to regenerate cadres' and soldiers' morale after the land-grabbing and flag-mounting campaigns and uprising had failed, and the cadres of all ranks were confused by the ever remote prospect of peace and by the more obvious prospect of dreadful fighting and protracted war.

In an attempt to calm the demoralized cadres and soldiers, the February 1973 Directive highlighted what COSVN called victories brought about by the Paris Agreement. Firstly, it said, North Vietnam had escaped the bombing, and could therefore give more intensive support to Communist forces in South Vietnam. Secondly, in South Vietnam, the US and allied forces had to withdraw all their troops, and, as a result, South Vietnam would be weakened and more vulnerable to Communist attack.

But, after dealing with encouraging "victories", the Directive suggested concern and even pessimism about the fact that ... "the puppet armed forces were still overwhelming; the tyrant oppressive machinery still held on in many places and controlled the greater part of the population; the hard-core tyrants were reinforced to control the infrastructure; the soldiers and their families were deceived by the puppet government. In consequence, even with the withdrawal of American forces, the puppet government is still able to survive as an instrument in the service of neo-colonialism in South Vietnam...".

Part II dealt generally with future activities. As far as propaganda was concerned, the Directive gave emphasis to new slogans such as: Peace, Independence, Democracy, Welfare, and National Reconciliation. But the strategic line of struggle remained as ever the protracted war. The Directive said: ..."it is imperative to grasp the essence of violence in the new situation, that is violence within the framework of political struggle movement by the mass and of guerrilla warfare," and ..."using armed actions against tyrants to create favourable conditions for successful political and military proselytizing movements."

Part III. The Directive set out the most important steps to be taken in motivating a mass political struggle movement:

Step (i): The development of a favourable psychological atmosphere for concerted action.

(a) Intensification of propaganda, developing a widespread movement to hail the Peace and the Paris agreement.

(b) Hailing the current victory and favourable trend; comparing them to GVN's failures and difficulties.

(c) Exploiting the opportunities opened up as a result of the whole people being confused by the Peace and its likely consequences.

Step (ii): Conversion from peaceful motive and movement to violent motive and movement.

The primary technique is, according to the Directive, to lead the masses away from hailing Peace to uniting in demands for the genuine realization of the Peace Agreement.

After that, the Directive ordered there should be a progression from demands for "realization of the Peace Agreement" to demands for "civil rights", "the reduction of military installations and outposts", "demobilization" "free movement", "civil disobedience" etc... The civilians would be asked to violate curfew hour, to trespass across military boundaries, that is to challenge the military authority.

Step (iii): the ultimate objective of the above rising movement is to culminate in mass violence through "provocation by disguised hands" converting the mass political struggle into "revolutionary violence" in which the people are the vanguard, and the armed units provide support from the rear. The well-known Communist tactic is to provoke the government forces to open fire. If necessary, the Communist cadres would disguise themselves as government agents and open fire on the civilians. In any case, the cadres were asked to avoid being identified and absolutely not to surface.

The Directive said about this step... "It is imperative to build up the political struggle movement into revolutionary violence by the masses in all forms, using sticks, hammers and swords etc... We must go through violence and bloodshed..."

Other parts of the Directive dealt with the building up of the infrastructure; the protection of structural forces; the avoidance of identification in the mass proselytizing activities; the need to improve the quality of guerrillas and infrastructure cadres; and the strengthening of the effectiveness of Party committees.

It would seem from the Directive that COSVN is not planning on a large-scale offensive at the moment as it says that at least until June 1973, the strategy is to be a mass political struggle with the people's movement in the vanguard, supported by armed units operating secretly in the rear.

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IT would appear from this that the Communists may have been forced to return to the strategic position of the early sixties. However, today's situation is not that of a decade ago. The GVN's position vis-a-vis the NLF is today much stronger, in every respect, than it was in 1960-1963.

The attitude of the rural population has markedly changed since 1963. If it is not entirely in support of the Saigon government, it is either neutral, or bitterly against the NLF. This is the main reason why the hamlet and village defence system is more effective now than before, and in many cases was able to repel the Communist offensive throughout last year's *Dong Khoi.*

A most important drawback in the Communists' effort to renew 1960's *Dong Khoi* strategy is the unfavourably changing relationship between political and military leadership within the NLF/COSVN system. In 1960, the NLF/COSVN political body was overwhelmingly strong compared to its newly established armed forces. That is a most important factor for victory in a People's War, because all the armed forces must operate in complete harmony with the political forces and with the Party's political objectives. By 1973, two developments acted against a harmonious relationship between political and military leadership. Firstly, most of the old body of talented, capable, experienced, and senior Party cadres had either been killed, died or rallied to the GVN. Secondly, the influx of NVA regular units into South Vietnam, especially in the Mekong Delta, as reinforcements to depleted local units, had taken over the political leadership from the local cadres (see "From The Mekong Delta to the Paris Talks" op.cit). To rebuild the body of political cadres, the NLF would need several years of training and development. This time-span is entirely incompatible with the urgent needs of today.

The quality and quantity of the support North Vietnam gives to the NLF will be of critical importance. The February Directive seemed optimistic on this score. But the crucial point is whether Russia and China will continue to maintain their massive military aid to Hanoi. It seems that Hanoi is not confident of this.

Whatever their intentions, the NLF's ability to mount a popular mass political struggle, supported by armed units is doubtful. First of all they have never regained the psychological momentum and morale lost in 1968, without which such a campaign is impossible. There is little prospect of their being able to regain it in the near future. Secondly, the staging of such a campaign requires favourable conditions in which to organize meetings as well as excellent communication and liaison systems to disseminate timely instructions and information. This requires good security for the infrastructure cadres and that means overall territorial control in populated areas. They do not possess this. Liaison from provincial and district authorities to villages and hamlets frequently takes a whole month because liaison links have been interrupted. The terrain is not safe from GVN harassment. Liaison cadres are in great shortage. Under such conditions even to gather a meeting of committee cadres is a difficult problem, let alone launching a massive campaign for the overall proselytization of the masses.

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IT is widely known that the ultimate objective of Hanoi continues to be the seizure of power in South Vietnam. After the 1973 cease-fire, two possibilities are open to Hanoi in pursuing this objective.

- The establishment of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord preceding a peaceful election.

or:

- The precipitation of a mass movement for violent political struggle leading to an uprising.

But, irrespective of the choice made a prerequisite condition, immediately following the cease-fire, was to grab quickly more land and more people at all cost. Only with a successful land-grabbing campaign, could the Communists attain the higher forms of struggle. That is to say, only with physical bases and population under control could they hope to gain by either alternative.

In this context, three questions arise:

Is Hanoi choosing to accept a general election organized by the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, or a mass movement of violent political struggle leading to a coup d'etat?

Supposing that neither of these two approaches offers the prospect of bringing victory to Hanoi, through its instrument the NLF, does Hanoi have a standby plan, such as renewing a large-scale offensive? Regarding this possibility, one has to consider the recent massive infiltration of NVA manpower and equipment into the northernmost area of South Vietnam and the movement of NVA troops into the Mekong Delta. At the same time one can merely guess about Hanoi's evaluation of the pros and cons of such a large-scale offensive.

How great is the binding effect of the Paris Peace Agreement with regard to North Vietnam armed actions, and would such a large-scale armed action lead to the nullification of the Agreement?

Regarding the first question, the analysis of the February 1973 Directive indicated that Communist preparations laid more emphasis on violent political struggle than on the establishment of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord leading to an election. This is mentioned only once in passing. This may imply that Hanoi considers the question of an election as a remote and unrealistic subject, as already explained. Or it may imply that Hanoi intends to use the mass movement of violent political struggle as a device to exert political pressure promoting an election in favour of the Communists. The second implication, however, is not very sound for two reasons.

Firstly, a mass movement of violent struggle as envisaged by the Communists would certainly face violence in return and, in addition, a chain reaction resulting

in widespread violence rather than a peaceful election. The Communist method of mobilizing a mass movement for violent struggle is not as effective today as it once was because GVN anti-riot tactics are now rather sophisticated.

Secondly, the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, a prerequisite for an election involving both sides of the war in South Vietnam, is a body without legs. Formally, the principle of three equal "segments" in the Council was designed to use a third party to reconcile and harmonize the other two opposing parties. In reality, in Vietnam today, no third political grouping could generate sufficient prestige or develop the necessary physical organization and power to persuade, and if necessary force, the other two parties to enter into mutual reconciliation and harmony. The promoters of the Council have placed all their hopes and confidence in the expected goodwill of each side. However they have been fundamentally misled by their political interpretation of the nature of this war. They have underestimated Communist determination to seize power through the utilization of military proselytizing tactics and the ignition of a general uprising, involving among other steps a systematic scheme to assassinate government officials and other so-called "tyrants". While one side is determined to use violent struggle to destroy its opponent, and the other side is determined to stand firm on its defence, the prospect of a peaceful reconciliation is extremely remote.

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NEITHER of the Communist alternatives – a peaceful election or a violent movement of mass political struggle – is likely to bring them success. In fact, despite COSVN instructions that the Directive should be widely studied and a subsequent plan of action should be completed before 15 March 1973, leading to a spreading mass movement of violent struggle, up to the time of writing (late May 1973), in many places, particularly in Dinh Tuong (My Tho), the Party Committee cadres at all levels had not been able to hold conferences to formulate concrete plans of action. The "mass movements" are still to appear. Under such a condition, one is inclined to think that COSVN is bound to do something in the hope of reversing its present deteriorating situation. COSVN is unlikely to have an alternative than to resort to forceful armed actions. Any armed action would have a variety of implications depending on the scale and the time factor. According to a high ranking ex-Communist cadre, at this stage any Communist armed action would be designed as a show of muscle in support of the political front. It would also aim at boosting the morale of NVA/VC forces. The sporadic Communist attacks which broke out in the first ten days of May, however, were kept well within the permissible limit allowed by the Paris Peace Agreement.

What concerns us is that if from June or July, when Hanoi sees that a mass movement by violent political struggle has little prospects, and the possibility of a victorious election has disappeared entirely, would it decide to launch a large-scale offensive? The answer greatly depends on how Hanoi is weighing the pros and cons of such an action. The infiltration of North Vietnamese manpower and equipment into South Vietnam so far has reached a proportion that induces one to think of a possible offensive at least of the same scale as last April's campaign.

Any Communist offensive in the weeks or months to come must be based on the following fundamental assumptions:

The US would not be in a position to retaliate by resuming airstrikes and a mine blockade against North Vietnam, or by giving air support to South Vietnamese forces. This assumption is supported by the definite completion of the process of U.S. disengagement from South Vietnam. The Vietnam war has become something of the past in the American memory. Moreover, the political mood in the American legislative body has become so difficult for President Nixon that he could not again become involved in South Vietnam.

The military deployment is improved in favour of Communist forces in 1973 in comparison with 1972. Since 27 January 1973 the NVA has been completely free to consolidate its bases, its logistics reserve, its installation in Khe Sanh (north-west of Quang Tri), in A Shau Valley (south of Hue), in the three theatre area in and around Loc Ninh, and in the Communist Zone C near the key provinces, particularly Saigon.

The political and psychological climate will be suitable for such an offensive as a result of domestic "progresses" (the mass movement of violent political struggle) and the international trend of events (the Watergate scandal and its impact on the Nixon Administration's potential to interfere with Hanoi aggression).

Whether these assumption are correct or not is not relevant here. The most important consideration is how they look in Hanoi's eyes. Equally important is the alternative open to Hanoi. What else could Hanoi do if it chooses not to launch a major offensive within the coming six months? This is a question of assessing what are the merits of playing a waiting game.

To answer this, considerations should be given to the analysis of opportunities and trends in domestic development in South Vietnam.

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ALTHOUGH it was said above that the Paris Agreement made no effective attempt to change the existing relative strength of both sides in South Vietnam, and Hanoi had to start again the process of conquest initiated 13 years ago, it must also be recognized that Hanoi can derive long-range benefits from the opportunities opened to it by the Paris Peace Agreement.

The first element of opportunity is the fact that the Paris Agreement did not work out any political solution but left it to discussions between the two sides of the war in South Vietnam. Unanimity is the guiding principle for any political agreement reached in these discussions. No deadline was set for the final outcome. In this context, either side can play the delaying tactic at its pleasure and to its advantage. It has been obvious that the Communists were the ones who have been trying to prolong the discussion and the failure of the land-grabbing campaign and the following mass movement of political violence justifies their need to do so. They still need more time in an effort to achieve what they did not achieve in the Mekong Delta during the last five months and to consolidate their gains in Central Vietnam.

The second element lies in the lack of a definite cease-fire demarcation line. A cease-fire without a demarcation line is nothing more that a child's game. Several things can happen under this condition. The weaker Communist forces can get out of their hiding places and claim territories that never belonged to them. This is easy to do in Central Vietnam's highland and mountainous areas, the so-called "No Man's Land." To challenge this move the GVN forces would have to mobilize large units and engage in large-scale operation in clear violation of the cease-fire agreement. Since the GVN forces did not attempt to commit such a large-scale violation, the Communists are the ones who gained from the loop-holes in the Paris Agreement. Even if the GVN forces tried to spread out their units to grab lands in the mountainous areas, they would run the risk of thinning out their defence and gravely jeopardizing the protection of populated areas. Since the Communists have practically no problems of protecting civilian population (not more than 3 per cent of the total population is under their control) they can spread out to grab land, at the same time concentrating their attacks on hundreds of weak spots held by GVN forces, thereby compelling the latter to retreat to conservative defence lines. This has been the pattern of events during the last few months, particularly in the II Corps Highlands where the GVN hardly has two divisions and usually is not in a favourable position to defend such a vast area of hills and valleys, jungles and bush.

The third element giving favourable opportunities to the Communists is the fact that the ICCS as envisaged by the Paris Agreement is incapable of unanimous agreement on practically anything. It is incapable of making its judgment heard by the parties concerned or of enforcing its decisions. It is incapable numerically of controlling and supervising the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Under such conditions several thousand NVA troops, hundreds of trucks and tanks, and tons of ammunition have been brought from North Vietnam to South Vietnam under the nose of the ICCS, in blatant violation of the Paris Agreement.

These excellent opportunities could continue to be offered to the Communists by the Paris Agreement. So far, the NVA forces have been able to rebuild at least three airfields on the soil of South Vietnam, one in Khe Sanh, and two in A Shau and a Luoi Valley. A major route from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) running south behind Quang Tri, Hue, Da Nang, and several smaller roads branching from it and reaching GVN-controlled areas in Central Vietnam, have also been built. These have been constructed by NVA engineering units, infiltrated into South Vietnam after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement and during the presence of the ICCS.

If Hanoi can maintain this rhythm of activities for the next three years, what will it have in South Vietnam by 1976? It would openly control a vast area of the Central Highlands and Truong Son Ranges, something it has never been able to achieve during the last 13 years. Militarily, Hanoi would have a bridge-head very deep into the flank of South Vietnam. This alone has a paramount military implication.

In combination with the complex tactics of prolonging the political talks, North Vietnam will be able to arrange "immigration" of at least 500,000 to 1 million North Vietnamese into South Vietnam during the next three years (a number of these first "immigrants" reportedly have reached and settled down in III Corps area, near Tay Ninh).

The overall picture is this: if Hanoi can best exploit the Paris Agreement, then, it will be able to maintain, for the next three years, the "military status-quo" without the necessity of reaching a political solution to its disadvantage. It can avoid a show-down of strength, and continue to build up its forces, in preparation for another offensive at a more favourable time.

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WHILE Hanoi can try to maintain the "military status quo", it can also promote the insurgency war in the GVN-controlled areas at a low level, at a low cost, and in a sporadic fashion. That is an active method of shaping the trend of political developments in South Vietnam to their advantage. At least, they could continue to recruit guerrillas, maintain scattered roadblocks, sabotage activities, assassinate government officials, collect taxes etc. This is enough to maintain a state of emergency in South Vietnam, preventing or at least undermining any large-scale efforts of reconstruction, rehabilitation and mobilization of economic potential. Hanoi's instrument, COSVN, could even launch battalion-size attacks every few months and send thousands of refugees fleeing to secured areas. It takes only a few hours of Communist attacks to create problems that require months or a year to solve.

On a higher strategic level, Hanoi may find favourable opportunities to exploit the great issues derived from the economic problems in South Vietnam and turn them to political advantage. These are welfare problems such as posed by war orphans, prostitutes, invalid and unemployed veterans, corruption and inefficiency etc., which

exist in any society in war time. If South Vietnam is not able to raise the people's standard of living (already alarmingly low) and if the leadership fails to clean up social vices and corruption (a chronic disease for many years, and now at a critical point) then these social defects will develop into a kind of political cancer that defies any cure and offers an ideal medium in which the Communists can promote their proselytizing activities.

These are the prospects that Hanoi may wishfully like to see come about. But whether Hanoi would be able to exploit the defects of South Vietnam and turn them into long-range assets, in favour of reactivating the strategy of People's Warfare as in 1960, remains to be seen. It is unlikely that the opportunity to ignite another successful *Dong Khoi,* will easily present itself. The GVN, with its present strength, has firm control of the populated areas. This is likely to remain the case as long as South Vietnam receives adequate economic aid as well as military resupply under the terms defined by the Paris Peace Agreement.

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WHEN this was being written, fighting was intensifying in all four military Corps as a result of Communist attacks. Two hundred acts of violation against the Paris Agreement by the Communists were recorded by government sources in one day. In the near future, it will be clear whether: the present stepping up of fighting is just a show of muscle by the Communists in support of their negotiators in Paris; or it is a prelude to a major military effort by the Communists aimed at reversing the trend of deteriorating conditions following the failure of the February 1973 Directive to bring satisfactory results; or both; or it is merely designed to consolidate the Communist military position as part of a long-range plan utilizing the February Directive's strategy in the short term and climaxing in another 1972 type all-out offensive in a year or two.

Notes and References

1. *Dong Khoi* means a concerted uprising undertaken by all citizens at the same time. It is an extremely important term in the glossary of the Vietnamese war terminology.

In 1960, the National Liberation Front ignited this war by a *Dong Khoi* campaign: its brilliant strategy consisted of a combination of military proselytizing operations, political warfare and armed offensive to win mastery of the countryside.

The *Dong Khoi* campaign was first initiated in the four provinces of Western Cochinchina, namely: Ben Tre (Kien Hoa) Kien Tuong, Kien Phong and Dinh Tuong (My Tho), then gradually spread all over western Cochinchina (IV Corps) to III, II and I Corps (that is, all over South Vietnam). It aimed at seizing control of the whole rural area by means of a variety of offensive fronts: terrorizing and isolation of the legitimate village and hamlet administration, undermining the prestige of government civil servants, encircling and destroying outposts, using agitprop techniques to motivate the masses to stage an uprising and seizing power in the hamlets and villages, preaching hatred and resentment among the masses through indoctrination courses and appealing to GVN soldiers to stand up for the NLF's cause.

The NLF enjoyed spectacular successes through the *Dong Khoi* campaign during the 1960-1963 period. Most of the hamlets and villages in the IV Corps (representing the rural area) and the II Corps (representing the mountainous area) one by one came under the control of the NLF.

In April 1972, the NLF opened a large-scale offensive which they also called the 1972 *Dong Khoi* campaign. There were fundamental differences between the 1972 *Dong Khoi* and that of the early 1960s. In 1960, the campaign was undertaken entirely by Southerners, who had stayed underground since 1954, with the armed support of local units. In 1972, the armed units were mostly North Vietnamese while the political cadres and the local NLF/VC structure were in quantity as well as in quality far weaker than in the early sixties.

2. A Communist term meaning a combination of armed, political and military proselytizing efforts.

3. *See* Frank Mount, "The Paris Agreement and the Future of Vietnam", *South-East Asian Spectrum* (Vol. 1, No. 3, April 1973, p. 20).

4. The cease-fire agreement of 27 January 1973 called for the establishment of a composite National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, in which the two South Vietnamese Parties would join with neutralist elements to work for an agreement within 90 days on internal arrangements in South Vietnam, including the new institutions to be set up at national and local levels.

5. The 20/7 area was the first occupied by the NLF in the 1960 *Dong Khoi* campaign. They called this area 20/7 (standing for 20 July) in commemoration of the date of the 1954 Geneva Accords partitioning Vietnam into two halves. The area occupied covered a long stretch of land in Dinh Tuong Province.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA: *The Australian Government has expressed a determination to grant independence by 1975 to a united Papua/New Guinea–at present two territories jointly administered by Australia, the former as an External Territory and the latter under a United Nations Trusteeship. This article discusses the range of possible developments which will determine relations between Australia and an independent Papua New Guinea. It is an abridgement of Professor Harries's chapter in a forthcoming book, "Australia's New Guinea Question" (edited by W.J. Hudson, and to be published by Angus and Robertson for the Australian Institute of International Affairs).*

Australia and an Independent Papua New Guinea

Owen Harries

BEFORE speculating about how an independent Papua-New Guinea may relate to Australia's regional policies, and the latter part of this article will have to be very speculative, it is worth looking back to see how a dependent Papua-New Guinea has been seen in this context over recent decades. What is immediately striking is how rapidly perceptions of the role of the territory–and indeed of the whole island–in Australia's foreign and defence policies have changed; and the changes have consistently been in the direction of downgrading its importance.

It is considerably less than twenty years since Menzies was declaring that Australia was in New Guinea to stay; Spender and Casey (and for that matter Evatt and Calwell) were insisting that the island was vital for Australia's security; an Australian government opposing and alienating "a neighbour with which we have no other difference whatsoever" (Casey's phrase) over the question of the future of that part of the island which was not even under its control; in the teeth of the winds of change, Australia was defending its jurisdiction in Papua-New Guinea on the basis of "a comprehensive and legally justified conservatism"[1] which was profoundly offensive to most of its anti-colonial Asian neighbours; and the working assumption of nearly all Australian politicians was "that there was an intense public opinion on New Guinea in Australia which was unlikely to alter. It had become ingrained in the minds of the Australian people and the Press".[2]

In a remarkably short period of time all these positions were abandoned. In 1960 Menzies made his famous statement announcing his change of mind on the granting of independence: "I think the prevailing school of thought today is that if in doubt you should go sooner, not later. I belong to that school of thought myself now, though I didn't once . . ." Although there was to be some subsequent foot dragging, this presaged a major change in Australian thinking about and preparation for the independence of the territory. At about the same time there was what has been described as "a profound shift" in Australia's policy on colonial issues at the United Nations, a shift away from a narrow legalism to "flexibility and much closer approximation to majority United Nations views".[3]

On the West New Guinea issue there was evidence of a change in Australia's position as early as February 1959 when, in the Casey-Subandrio communique, Australia agreed not to oppose any agreement arrived at between the Indonesians and the Dutch by "peaceful processes and in accordance with internationally accepted principles". Despite government claims to the contrary, this clearly amounted to a major retreat from the position earlier expressed by government spokesmen that "should discussions between the Netherlands and Indonesia tend towards any arrangement which would alter the status of New Guinea, the matter is no longer one merely for those two parties themselves" and that Australia's "direct and vital interests . . . are entitled to be considered".[4]

Three years later, when agreement was reached on the transference of the territory to Indonesia, the Australian government accepted the outcome with reasonable grace.

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WHY did these changes occur with such startling speed? Various reasons have been given. Menzies' change of mind has been linked with his experience at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in 1960. Sawer and Hudson suggest a number of reasons for Australia's changed stance in the United Nations. "It would seem", they write, "that a point was reached where Australian policy-makers agreed that 'the UN . . . cannot be defied without some risk or damage to the national

interest' ",[5] an agreement they think was made easier by the fact that swollen membership and predictable majorities were reducing the seriousness of Assembly activities (which made it less important to oppose them), that a change of personnel had removed the men most closely associated with the 'hard line' on colonial issues and that Australia had become resigned at last to a fairly imminent departure from Papua-New Guinea, (which made a firm stand unnecessary).

On the West New Guinea issue, Australia's change of stance has usually been explained in terms of lack of diplomatic support, particularly from the United States and Britain, who showed no inclination to alienate Indonesia over what was to them an insubstantial issue, and of lack of convincing military strength.

While all these explanations may have some merit[6], they seem inadequate to explain the extent and rapidity of the changes. For implicit in these changes, and, it seems to me, necessary in order to explain them, is a more fundamental change; a reassessment of the strategic importance of New Guinea for Australia's security. If the old and often repeated view that New Guinea was "vital" to Australia's security, that it was the "key" to our defence—either in the positive sense of being a "bulwark" or in the negative one of being a potential "springboard" for an invader—had still prevailed, it would have been overriding. States do not readily adjust to winds of change or United Nations majorities when something they really consider vital to their security is at stake. Friendly relations with unpredictable neighbours do not take precedence over vital interests. If West New Guinea had really been considered essential to Australia's defence, lack of diplomatic support would not have led to such a ready capitulation and more strenuous efforts would have been made to support Australia's diplomatic stance with convincing military strength.

At some time in the late 'fifties a reappraisal must have taken place which substantially downgraded the strategic importance of New Guinea, whether it occurred as the result of rational analysis or of an instinctive adjustment to new circumstances. It was noticeable that during this period those making Australia's case in the West New Guinea dispute shifted their emphasis quite markedly from the argument about Australian security to that about the rights of indigines, a change which is at least compatible with such a reappraisal. By the end of the decade it was virtually left to the leaders of the Opposition to argue the old line, which they did with evident sincerity.[7]

A downgrading of New Guinea's strategic importance did not have to be based on the simplistic arguments put forward by some academic commentators that changes in weapon technology had made New Guinea virtually irrelevant.[8] A more tenable argument was that the American commitment to Australia's security under ANZUS, combined with the "forward defence" provided by the American and British commitments to the north, drastically reduced the likelihood of any threat to the Australian mainland in the context of which New Guinea would have been crucial. This did not mean that the importance of the island became negligible. There was still the possibility which was very real while Indonesia was ruled by a Sukarno dedicated to living dangerously. But divorced from a threat to the mainland this was something which could be lived with. Moreover, such conflicts were only of direct concern to Australia as long as it continued to be a colonial power on the island. The relationship between strategic and political arguments therefore became quite different from what they had been: while New Guinea was considered strategically vital to Australian security it was imperative that Australia maintained its control over Papua New Guinea; but if the only perceived threat was to New Guinea itself then the continuation of Australian control merely added to its defence responsibilities and contributed little or nothing to Australia's security. An ending of Australia's jurisdiction could, therefore, be seen as advantageous in security terms. It would also, of course, be advantageous in terms of Australia's relationships with the countries of South-East Asia, particularly Indonesia.

Whether such calculations as these were made or not, by the mid-sixties it was no longer accepted dogma that New Guinea was strategically vital. In 1965, Australia's best informed academic commentator on defence matters, T.B. Millar, making full use of military semantics, declared that Papua-New Guinea was strategically "essential" but not "vital".[9] From what followed it was clear that "essential" in this sense meant something like "inessential but still significant".

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RATHER oddly, perhaps, as Papua-New Guinea moved rapidly towards self-government in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies, its importance as a factor in Australian foreign policy diminished.[10] There were several reasons for this. One was the replacing of the unpredictable and volatile Suharto by the sober and unadventurous Suharto regime and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party, P.K.I., as a political force, which removed any immediate worries of interference in the internal affairs of the territory by the only country in a position to do so. Another was that much of the sting went out of the anti-colonial attack on Australia's performance in the United Nations. This was due partly to the development of a rather more pragmatic political style in the Afro-Asian States themselves (several of the most flamboyant first generation figures had now left the stage), partly to the focussing of attention on more dramatic African issues, but mainly to the fact that Australia's performance made it more difficult to sustain hostile criticism. As the attacks diminished in intensity and became more ritualistic in character, Australia became more relaxed and less anxious in dealing with them.[11]

There was one other reason for the diminishing importance attached to New Guinea. From the mid 'sixties

onwards, it was over-shadowed by the Vietnam issue. The impact of Vietnam on Australian politics in general and on its foreign policy in particular was profound. The emotions attaching to New Guinea as a symbol, already weakened as they were by the passing of time, were displaced, at least temporarily, by the very powerful ones engendered by the Vietnam conflict. In Vietnam the policy of "forward defence", central to Australia's regional posture, was put to the test. The logic of forward defence and, even more that of the domino theory, gave New Guinea a low priority. In its scenarios, New Guinea was a fall-back position – or the eighth or ninth domino. The reaction against that logic as often as not took the form of the advocacy of neutralism or of "fortress Australia", and these positions too were resistant to any assumption of responsibility for the security of Papua-New Guinea. The more generalized reaction against involvement in the Vietnam conflict tended to assume the form of an anti-militarism which was impatient of *any* commitment and hostile to the whole "realist" approach to foreign policy. Because of all this, and because Vietnam absorbed the limited energy which Australians have shown themselves prepared to devote to the discussion of foreign policy, the problems posed by a Papua-New Guinea rapidly approaching independence received relatively scant attention.

But if an immediate effect of Vietnam was to thrust New Guinea into the background, its ultimate effect was to undermine the conditions which sustained and justified Australia's regional policy. The reduced American commitment (following hard on British withdrawal), the ending of bipolar confrontation and containment, the Nixon visit to Peking and the shock waves it set in motion – Mr. Whitlam was exaggerating less than politicians usually do about the misfortunes of their opponents when he wrote in January, 1972, that "the Liberal Party foreign policy is in tatters. Its foundations have crumbled".[12] But if this was so, what policy was to replace it? On what new foundation was it to be established? What importance would such a policy attach to a Papua-New Guinea on the brink of independence?

In 1973 anyone attempting to answer these questions has to face three difficult problems, come to some tentative conclusions concerning them and then relate these conclusions to each other. The first of these is the problem of finding some organizing principle or model with which to approach the post-Nixon Doctrine, post-Vietnam politics of the region. The second is that of anticipating very early in the piece what foreign policy course the first Labor Government in twenty-three years will chart. And the third is that of making some prediction concerning the international and domestic behaviour and prospects of an independent Papua-New Guinea.

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AS far as the first is concerned, for the best part of two decades the basic pattern of regional politics was one of a remarkably stable, static, bipolar arrangement (described by one power as "containment" and by the other as "encirclement") superimposed on a very unstable and conflict-ridden small state situation. It was a pattern characterized by a high ideological content, lack of flexibility, a tendency towards the militarization of politics, and very intimate relationships between the two great Powers and many of the small States (reflected just as much in the ability of the latter to exploit and manipulate the former as in the interference of the former in the affairs of the latter). This pattern began to disintegrate at the end of the 'sixties and by now the process is far advanced.

Almost as soon as it began, a virtual consensus emerged that the old pattern would be replaced by one of "multipolar" equilibrium or balance. According to this view a diminution in American "weight" in the region would go along with the certainty of a much more serious Soviet involvement, the probability of a growing Japanese interest and, in some versions, the possibility of Western Europe as a fifth interested Power. A multipolar system of this kind would be intrinsically less stable than the old one because of the much wider range of possibilities it opened up. One would expect it to be characterized not by stable alliances and hostilities but by constant manoeuvre and adjustment. It would put a lower premium on ideological purity and consistency and a higher one on flexibility and pragmatism. The equilibrium it promised would be a shifting one requiring constant adjustment and attendance; it would arise out of the limitations of the individual members in relation to the system as a whole rather than from fixed relationships among the States. In such a changeable state of affairs it would not be wise for the small and middle Powers of the region to look after their interests (a policy which requires a high degree of predictability in the behaviour of the great Power in question); instead, they would be likely to "view their own interests as best served by the preservation of an equilibrium among the three or four great Powers"[13] and to use what influence they could muster to strengthen the mutual checks and balances available to the great Powers in their relationships with each other.

This is a plausible hypothesis concerning the future politics of Asia and there is a good deal of evidence to support it. But perhaps the eager and rather uncritical way in which it has been accepted has something to do with the analysts' need to find order and pattern which will make complexity manageable. For there are good reasons for having reservations about the emergence of such a system. It has been pointed out, for example, that there is an enormous disparity in the power of the units which would make up such a system, with the United States and the Soviet Union being in quite a different class from the others. There is also a real uncertainty as to the relative power of the two super States in the near future. On the basis of its economic predominance and its strategic might, it may be argued that the United States will still be dominant in the region.[14] However, if one focusses on less tangible elements such as image, will, the ability to mobilize internal support, and ideological position, one may conclude that the advantages are on the side of the

Soviet Union.[15] Such conclusions may go along with a denial of the emergence of a multipolar system ("There is, in short, no multipolar system emerging, unless one takes the term as a euphemism for the spread of confusion, or possibly chaos"[16]) or they may be fitted into a multipolar model to give a final model significantly different from the equilibrium one sketched above (". . .the diffusion of power represented in the process may come at the expense of one of today's super Powers and create potential advantages for the other. . . During the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity an astute Soviet leadership. . . can anchor itself into a position of relative advantage in the new system"[17]).

Apart from these fairly specific objections, some versions of the multipolar equilibrium model are open to the more general criticism that they overlook the probability of important surprises[18] in the affairs of the region. Such surprises have been a feature of the recent past (the coup in Indonesia, the "Cultural Revolution" and the resulting isolation of China, the withdrawal of Johnson as American Presidential candidate in 1968, Nixon's Peking visit) and the present situation is currently fluid and uncertain enough to justify expectations of more to come. (Japanese militarism? Post-Mao changes in China? A sharp shift of mood in the United States? A reversion to "Sukarnoism" in Indonesia?) While it is necessary to hypothesize about the politics of the region in the next decade, a certain tentativeness and modesty are surely in order.

But whatever conclusion one reaches, and however tentatively one holds it, one thing is certain. Papua-New Guinea will become independent in a region significantly different from the one in which earlier new States came into existence. It will not be faced with the comparatively simple task of deciding where it stands in relation to a clear-cut, stable conflict. It will emerge at a time when the "Third World" has lost much of its ideological head of steam and figures much less prominently in the calculations of the great Powers than it did a few years ago. Papua-New Guinea, therefore, has at least a chance of beginning its independent existence with an experience comparatively rare for new States – that of suffering from (or enjoying) a "benign neglect" on the part of the Powers. But this is by no means certain, for in a fluid and unstable situation it is always possible for some conjunction of events to thrust even the most obscure territory into a position of temporary prominence.

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HOW can we expect the Labor Government to conduct Australian foreign policy in these circumstances? The key figure in the making of this policy – though he has competitors inside and outside his Ministry and though their influence may increase with the passing of time – is the Prime Minister, Mr. Whitlam, so it is important to examine his views.

Mr. Whitlam sees the present period as one of unparalleled complexity and confusion but also as one offering the best opportunity for a "settlement" since 1954. Failure to achieve that settlement "carries the seeds of total catastrophe"[19]. That catastrophe would presumably take the form of a confrontation between the two super Powers in our region, for he is on record as seeing this as the most serious danger in Asia. In looking for a third force to hold the ring between the protagonists, he turns, surprisingly, not to China or Japan but to Europe, and he sees Australia as "incomparably well placed" to assist Europe in this task.[20] Japan is seen as a country preoccupied with its own problems of adjustment and as likely to be "the first great economic power to break the nexus between economic strength and military strength",[21] an innovation which, if it occurs, would tend to curtail Japan's political effectiveness. China he sees as a country dominated by fear rather than ambition and one whose "reactions to her neighbours are based on her historical experience, not on the ideology of her rulers".[22]

Although Mr. Whitlam does not subscribe to the "multipolar equilibrium" view as such, and although he seems to attach different weights to the various actors from those usually ascribed to them in such a model, his conclusions as far as policy is concerned are consistent with that view. He is very struck with Canada's diplomatic performance and has proposed it as an "exemplar" for Australia.[23] What he admires about Canada is its skill in taking initiatives which create better conditions for understanding and rapprochement among the Powers, which ease them on to the path of sane relations, and which, incidentally, have enabled it to achieve "diplomatic results out of all proportion to (its) size or power". It is this sort of role – that of an interpreter, a go-between, a broker – which much of what Mr. Whitlam says seems to envisage for Australia. We should help Japan and America adjust to changing realities; we can moderate Chinese fears of Japanese militarism; we are well placed to assist in preventing a confrontation between the super Powers; we can assist and encourage regional co-operation. And so on.[24] As long as it does not degenerate into simply "doing good" and is not accompanied by delusions of self-importance, such a role comes very near to that of working to maintain equilibrium, a role which some thoughtful commentators advocate as Australia's best option in the emerging circumstances.

Mr. Whitlam's reaffirmations of the importance of the American alliance and his occasional reference to regionalism do not obscure his stress on the two conditions necessary for successfully playing the middle-man role: a degree of independence and an acceptable image or reputation. Mr. Whitlam lays the heaviest stress on both of these. In his short statement at the end of his first Press conference as Prime Minister he spoke of "a more independent Australian stance in international affairs . . . an Australia which will enjoy a growing standing as a distinctive, tolerant, co-operative and well-regarded nation"; and a large proportion of his early foreign policy decisions were symbolic and image-building in character.

In so far as independence is a goal, it requires not only

the creation of some distance between the United States and Australia but the avoiding of *any* closely binding ties, including regional ones. It is not surprising therefore that Mr. Whitlam has shown little enthusiasm for such ties (though he has stressed the importance of friendly relations with Indonesia), and has followed a "go it alone" policy over the recognition of China and North Vietnam.

It seems quite clear that it is largely in the context of a concern for Australia's image that Mr. Whitlam thinks of Papua-New Guinea. "Our conduct in Papua-New Guinea", he writes, "is the matter on which, more than anything else, we are being judged by other nations".[25] In the first weeks in office he particularly went out of his way to change Australia's image on colonial and racial questions, and it was in these terms that the determination to make Papua-New Guinea an independent state before the end of 1974, whatever the professed wishes of its government, was justified.

It is true that in the past he has also justified early independence with other arguments. One of these, the argument that far from unity being a precondition for independence, independence is the precondition for unity and that the longer independence is delayed the stronger separation will grow, is an interesting argument, even if some would maintain that the experience of many other new States tells against it. He is on much weaker ground when he downgrades the fundamental character of separatist tendencies by implying that they are the work of expatriates, as he has done repeatedly. It is simply not true that "in the background of every separatist movement . . . are expatriates",[26] if by this is meant that expatriates are an important causal factor in the genesis of such movements.

Tentatively, one may predict that an independent Papua-New Guinea will be approached in terms of concern with international image and of good relations with Indonesia. What this will mean in practice will depend largely on how issues arise, but one can expect generosity in terms of aid to be balanced by extreme reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of the country (even if that is requested), a punctilious regard for diplomatic propriety (it has been stressed that in no circumstances will Australia deal with anyone other than the central government), and a willingness to sacrifice the interests of Australian investors in Papua-New Guinea rather than risk the taint of neo-colonialism.

In matters affecting relations between Papua-New Guinea and Indonesia, choices will be more difficult, but if the analysis given above is correct, one would expect the inclinations of Mr. Whitlam to be towards mediation rather than towards commitment to either side, if events offered any possibility of this. As to reactions to the intrusion of any great Power into the affairs of Papua-New Guinea, it is possible that Mr. Whitlam is so confident that "threats" of this kind are unlikely in the foreseeable future that no consideration has been given to such a contingency.

One leading commentator, whose views receive respectful attention in Canberra, recently wrote in the context of a general argument in favour of minimizing Australia's strategic involvement in the region: "The commitment from which it will prove most difficult to extricate ourselves is the one we have to Papua-New Guinea. We should, I think, make it clear to the government of an independent Papua-New Guinea that we will not underwrite the internal security or the unity of that country. If we accept responsibility in relation to the external defence of Papua-New Guinea, this should be loose and transitional in nature. Our ultimate objective should be to have no closer strategic connexion with Papua-New Guinea than with any other neighbouring country".[27] If the outline of Mr. Whitlam's approach to foreign policy given above is near the truth, these prescriptions are likely to be well received. In terms of a fairly narrowly defined realism there is undoubtedly much to be said for them, for not only would intervention to restore order in the country's internal affairs or to protect it against a third party almost certainly be a messy and expensive business, but it would also get in the way of establishing the new anti-colonial image which seems necessary for Mr. Whitlam's foreign policy strategy. Whether non-intervention in the face of serious and continuing internal disorder or of blatant external attack would be sustainable however, is another matter.

So far we have discussed likely Labor Government policy purely in terms of Mr. Whitlam. But before leaving this question it should at least be noted that there are other forces at work in and on the Labor Government. Some members of the ministry are much more radical than Mr. Whitlam and some of the trade unions which are able to bring effective pressure to bear on the Labor Party are, in turn, much more radical than those ministers. Both have already given indications that they tend to influence foreign policy, notably in their reactions to the American bombing of North Vietnam in January, 1973; it remains to be seen to what extent they can succeed in doing so.

The views of some of them concerning Papua-New Guinea would have been expressed by Mr. Laurie Aarons, the National Secretary of the Communist Party of Australia, in his opening report to the Party's Twenty-Third National Congress in 1972: "I believe that New Guinea is a vital question for us and I believe there is a possibility that New Guinea will see a national liberation struggle and that the struggle will pose questions for Australian capitalism; it will be just as important, just as revolutionary as questions posed in America about the Vietnam war. Our work on this question must be developed further, not left to a few people to do something about New Guinea".[28]

For those holding such views, the granting of independence to a moderate, pragmatic government, friendly to Western capitalist investments, will merely be the inauguration of a neo-colonialist set-up. They can be expected to encourage and support "national liberation struggles" to replace such a regime – both as ends in them-

selves and as an indirect means of radicalizing Australian politics on the Vietnam-U.S. model. They are not without the resources to do so and the most obvious way for them to act would be to exert pressure on a Labor Government not to aid the central government against any movement which could plausibly be described as "progressive". How successful they would be would depend largely on the determination Mr. Whitlam would show in opposing them, and at the time of writing this is something which has still to be put to the test.

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THE third major variable which will determine how an independent Papua-New Guinea will fit into Australia's regional policy will be the political character of that State itself, both in its domestic and its international aspects. Most informed observers are pessimistic about Papua-New Guinea's chances of achieving a stable, effectively functioning, political state. Not only is the Afro-Asian track record not encouraging, but the perceptible strains and divisions within the territory and the fragility of its political institutions do not inspire confidence. The best that many would expect would be a "broken-backed" State, which has been defined as "a foreign office attached to domestic chaos", or, more soberly, as a situation where the appearance of Statehood is maintained but where the effective writ of the central government declines rapidly beyond about twenty miles of the capital and a few provincial centres.[29] This is the state of affairs which actually exists in many new States. Even if this is thought to be exaggerated, it is difficult to see how the new State can avoid the familiar and serious problems of separatism, lawlessness, uncontrolled urban drift, military intervention in politics, and so on. These will be exacerbated by the equally familiar dilemma that the social mobilization necessary for "nation-building" will result in the increasing politicization of hitherto passive groups.

In circumstances like these it is even more futile than usual to approach foreign policy in terms of purely rational behaviour, except as a theoretical exercise.[30] Instead of thinking in terms of "decision makers" sitting down and progressing logically from values to interests, goals, strategies and tactics, it is more useful to consider what functions foreign policies usually perform in the political systems of new States. One such function is what economists call commodity differentiation. That is, one consideration affecting the choice of policy is the desire to distinguish oneself clearly from someone else (whether another country or another faction or party within one's own country). This function is unusually important for new States because they tend to have identity problems of varying severity. Both for external and internal purposes they are likely to look for a distinctive position, particularly in relation to their erstwhile master. In this sense foreign policy has its part to play in "nation-building". Another important and well-recognized function of foreign policy is that of a distraction from internal failure. The point is less often made that it may be used to *justify* internal failure (as when economic scarcity is justified in terms of spartan preparation for some inevitable struggle). Another function may be to compensate, more often than not ideologically, some faction or group of factions which cannot be satisfied domestically but which is significant enough to require compensation. More frequently, perhaps, it is used to maintain the prestige and status of the charismatic leader by giving him a more impressive stage to play on and script to read. Or, more mundanely, it may be used to tip the scales in domestic politics by acquiring rich and powerful foreign friends who will give support which is cashable in terms of domestic politics (as aid is cashable in terms of patronage). It is not suggested that these functions are peculiar to the foreign policy of new States; indeed it is not difficult to see how Australian foreign policy (and the alternative policy of the Opposition) in the last twenty years may be largely explained in terms of them. But the lack of consensus and legitimization, the absence of agreement about "national interests", tend to make them more prominent and obvious in new States.

On this basis we can speculate that while Papua-New Guinea will be heavily dependent on Australian aid and assistance, it will also – and partly as a compensation for that dependence – tend to take up positions distinct from and even hostile to Australia. These issues are likely to cluster around the concepts of racism and neo-colonialism, though the Torres Strait border is obviously also a leading candidate.

It will try to diversify its sources of aid and support and it may well succeed. For while there is truth in the comforting assertion (comforting, that is, for Australians) that New Guinea is not a very attractive proposition for any major Power to take an interest in, it is also true that the investment which would be required to make a sizeable impact would be quite small from such a Power's point of view. Indeed, Japan has already began to make significant investments and has announced its willingness to give development aid at the rate of US$50 million a year, which would match Australia's contributions. (There has been no public indication of what conditions would be attached to such aid, but it would be foolish to assume that there would be none.) Moreover the country could rapidly become more attractive with the discovery of more mineral deposits, particularly oil. A substantial oil deposit in the West Pacific, at a time when the demands on world resources are increasing rapidly – and the countries of the Middle East give every indication that they intend to exploit the situation to the limit – would be of considerable interest to the United States and Japan. If Papua-New Guinea experiences serious internal conflict which is not resolved quickly, competing foreign policies can be expected, with the challenging groups appealing for support from governments other than Australia and also possibly from non-government groups in Australia.

As well as its ties with Australia, the new States will share a common border with Indonesia. This border will

receive greater prominence when plans to work mineral deposits across it are put into effect. But Indonesian-Papua-New Guinea relationships will be determined by the general character and performance of the two governments. As long as the pragmatic, "problem-solving" Suharto government continues in office and continues to make steady progress, and as long as the government of Papua-New Guinea maintains a low level competence in holding the country together, serious conflicts are unlikely. In the quite likely event that Papua-New Guinea experiences serious internal disorder, however, or in the considerably less likely event that it should turn out to be a spectacular success which contrasts sharply with Indonesian performance, particularly in West Irian, strains and tensions would inevitably develop.

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IT is impossible in an article of this length to go very far in exploring the patterns which the variables just discussed might form before the end of this decade. Perhaps the most useful thing to attempt is the setting out of the best and the worst combinations of circumstances which might develop.

The optimum state of affairs would involve the combination of five conditions. First, the multilateral equilibrium which many have predicted would become a reality. Three, four or five great Powers would hold each other in balance at a low level of conflict, with none of the participants feeling that anything important enough to risk upsetting the system was at stake in the region. Second, a significant degree of regional co-operation, either formalized or informal, would develop among the States in the region with the objects both of resolving conflicts among themselves and minimizing great Power interference in their affairs. Third, Indonesia would continue to make steady progress in putting its internal affairs in order under the existing regime. Fourth, Papua-New Guinea itself would also make steady, unspectacular progress, comfortably containing any secessionist or other challenge to a moderate, pragmatic government in Port Moresby, while doing nothing to increase its international visibility significantly. And, lastly, Australian foreign policy would be subject to firm, unified, and ideologically centrist control.

Given such a set of circumstances, Papua-New Guinea would pose few serious problems and would figure in Australian foreign policy mainly as the prime recipient of aid, an important area of Australian investment and as a protege to be discreetly helped and sponsored.

The worst case conditions are in effect the negation of those just listed. First, the absence of great Power equilibrium, as would happen, for example, if the United States lost all serious interest in the region and the Soviet Union acquired a strong one. An insecure or humiliated Japan which turned to militarism in the absence of other options could bring about the same result. If this happened, the chances of the second condition, regional co-operation, being fulfilled would also diminish, for a period of equilibrium and reasonable stability is probably necessary for the habit of such co-operation to be established. In a state of multipolar instability the States of the region would be much more likely to play their own game and attempt to further their interests by making individual accommodations with great Powers at each others' expense. It is as well to remember that "multipolarity" and "equilibrium" are not synonymous terms and that "it is all too easy to imagine a multi-hierarchical system of dizzying instability".[31] The third element in a worst case syndrome would be an Indonesian reversion to pre-1965 patterns of behaviour or their equivalent, resulting in a suspicious and assertive interest in the affairs of neighbouring countries. Such an interest would be particularly likely to focus on Papua-New Guinea if, fourthly, that country was to achieve increased prominence, either as the result of internal conflict or of its acquiring, or having attributed to it, some asset which attracted outside attention. Finally, there is the possibility of an ideological conflict about Australian foreign policy, with left-wing elements inside and outside the Labor Government attempting to force a more radical and "socialist" policy on the ministry. Estimates of how likely such a development is will vary widely, but in the nature of things there is certain to be some pressure; and it is as likely to focus on relations with Papua-New Guinea, where Australia's foreign capitalist investments are concentrated, as anywhere else.

On this basis it would be easy to construct a really frightening – and not entirely implausible – scenario of a disintegrating and mineral rich Papua-New Guinea attracting the active interest of, first, a rearming Japan and, secondly, of an alarmed and unstable Indonesia, with this in turn reactivating those deep-set fears which we have been assured are part of the Australian character, as well as stimulating ideological demands to assist "progressive" elements in the islands' internal affairs.

But the odds against such a conjunction of events are probably as great as they are against the best case syndrome. What is much more likely than either is a mix of favourable and unfavourable developments. At present one would have to say that the likelihood of any great Power taking a serious interest in Papua-New Guinea seems rather remote. There also seems little to indicate an early Indonesian reversion to "living dangerously". On the other hand, the chances of serious, sustained disorder and disunity in Papua-New Guinea would have to be rated rather high. As to the future course of Australian foreign policy, this is, oddly perhaps, one of the most difficult factors of all to predict. The mixture of inexperience, boldness and ambition in Mr. Whitlam's make-up; the powerful pressures working on him in the Labor movement; the residual emotions attaching to New Guinea; and three decades of emphasis on threats from the north and the need to protect our northern approaches – all these considerations make it extremely difficult to predict how Australia might react to the range of situations which may confront us in Papua-New Guinea.

Notes and References

1. G. Sawer and W.J. Hudson, "The United Nations" in Greenwood and Harper, *Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965* (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968), p. 243.
2. This is how Casey explained Australian attitudes to the Indonesian Foreign Minister in October 1955. See *Australian Foreign Minister, The Diaries of R.G. Casey 1951-60* (Collins, 1972) p. 225.
3. Sawer and Hudson, p. 234. They stress, however, that though the shift was marked, "Australia did not in any sense 'go over' to the anti-colonial camp". That step was not taken until December, 1972.
4. Percy Spender speaking as Minister for External Affairs in June 1950. See *Current Notes* Vol. 21.
5. Sawer and Hudson, p. 245. The quote within the quotation is from Beddie, "A Problem in Foresight", *New Guinea* Vol. 1 No. 2, 1965.
6. Though not all of Sawer and Hudson's points hang well together. If swollen membership caused Assembly activities to be taken less seriously one would think it easier, not harder, to defy its decisions.
7. See, for example, the contribution of Evatt and Calwell to the West New Guinea debate, 24 February 1959. Evatt did not "care a fig for those people who say that the question of Australian defence is not inseparably bound up with New Guinea, whatever particular changes in weapons take place". Calwell quoted Spender's 1954 view that "New Guinea will forever be a potential invasion springboard to Australia" approvingly, and rubbished the "amateur strategists" who disagreed.
8. For a good example of such an argument see the contribution of Dr Derek Van Abbe to *New Guinea and Australia* (A.I.P.S. & Angus & Robertson 1958) p. 192.
9. T.B. Millar, "The Defence of New Guinea", *New Guinea* Vol. 1, March-April 1965, pp. 68-75.
10. It should be remembered that the current assessment of Papua-New Guinea's strategic importance for Australia is not the last word. For decades the islands were regarded as strategically vital. Circumstances changed and their importance was greatly downgraded. But the circumstances which have led to their downgrading are as certain to be as transient as those earlier ones which caused it to be considered vital. Nothing is final, and Papua-New Guinea may well resume its prominence in Australian eyes long before the end of the century.
11. See W.J. Hudson's forthcoming chapter on "The United Nations" in Greenwood & Harper, (Editors). *Australia in World Affairs 1966-70,* (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1973).
12. E.G. Whitlam: *The Daily Telegraph* (Sydney) 24 January 1972, p. 15.
13. H. Bull "The New Balance of Power in Asia & the Pacific", *Foreign Affairs,* July 1971, p. 676.
14. See, for example, L.H. Gelb's paper "Walking the Tightrope in East Asia and the Pacific" given at the Australian Institute of Political Science seminar at Canberra, January 1973.
15. See, for example, W. Laqueur "The World of the Seventies", *Commentary* August 1972; and J.R. Swanson "The Superpowers and Multipolarity: From Pax Americana to Pax Sovietica", *Orbis* Winter 1972.
16. Laqueur, *Commentary* p. 28.
17. Swanson, *Orbis* pp. 1035-1050.
18. A point emphasized by Gelb, *op. cit.*
19. E.G. Whitlam "Australia & Her Region" in *Towards a New Australia* (Cheshire 1972), pp. 1-4.
20. Speech in House of Representatives, 9 May 1972, *Hansard* pp. 2231-32.
21. E.G. Whitlam "The United States, China and Japan: Australia's Role", Address to the Institute of International Affairs, Townsville, Sept. 1971, p. 20.
22. "Australia and Her Region", p. 13.
23. e.g. Townsville address p. 5, "Australia and Her Region" p. 4.
24. Thus, in his address to the National Press Club, 26 July 1971, he saw Australia as "uniquely well placed to improve relations between China, the United States, Japan and Indonesia". In parliament ten months later he claimed that Australians are "incomparably well placed" to help Europe prevent a super Power confrontation in Asia.
25. "Australia and Her Region", p. 15.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 15. Mr. Whitlam repeated this view in a television interview with Professor Henry Mayer and the author on *Television Tutorial,* Channel 7 Sydney, 1972. A reading of Clifford Geertz' famous piece on primordial sentiments in *Old Societies and New States* (Free Press 1963), should convince anyone that the influence of expatriates is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for separatist movements.

27. Professor Hedly Bull in a paper on "Options for Australia" gives at the Australian Institute of Political Science Summer School at Canberra, January 1973.

28. Reported in *Tribune*, 4-10 April 1972, p. 2. As the context implies—this statement is regarded as significant not so much because of the strength of the C.P.A. itself as because it represents a view generally acceptable to the radical left.

29. See Hugh Tinker "Broken Backed State" in *New Guinea* Vol. 2 No. 3, October, 1967.

30. See Thomas Schelling's comments on the assumption of rational behaviour in the study of the theory of strategy in the first chapter of *The Strategy of Conflict* (Oxford University Press, 1963). He maintains that "the premise of 'rational behaviour' is a potent one for the production of theory" but that "if our interest is the study of actual behaviour, the results we reach under this constraint may prove to be either a good approximation of reality or a caricature".

31. Stanley Hoffman quoted in Laqueur, *op. cit.*

Editorial Note

In his first major foreign policy statement to the House of Representatives on 24 May 1973, the Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mr. Gough Whitlam, included the following passage on Papua-New Guinea:

"Our civil aid and defence policies will have a particular bearing on Australia's future relationship with Papua-New Guinea, whose independence will be achieved, I confidently expect, in the closest consulation with the Government and House of Assembly of Papua-New Guinea by 1975. Though the constitutional link has not yet been severed, we shall increasingly consider our policies towards Papua-New Guinea not in any nostalgic colonial sense, but as though we were already dealing with a fully independent State.

In the period before independence the Government will do everything possible to meet Australia's obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement and to ensure the smooth and amicable transfers of power to the Government of a united Papua-New Guinea. We very well know how important this period is for the foundation of Australia's future relationship with the independent nation of Papua New Guinea. I look forward to this relationship fraternally and on a broad front that goes well beyond normal diplomatic ties. Papua New Guinea will occupy a special position on Australia's network of relationships, but we do not seek an exclusive relationship with Papua New Guinea which will want to find its own place in the international community. As Papua New Guinea's Foreign Service develops and as its range of international interests grows, we shall be ready to help where we can and as we are asked.

Papua New Guinea will have the first call on our foreign aid programme and we shall work closely with the central Government of Papua New Guinea through a specific and guaranteed economic programme. We shall, however, place no inhibitions whatsoever on the Government of Papua New Guinea in seeking aid or investment from any country she may choose to invite to take part in her development.

We are also anxious that outstanding questions relating to Papua New Guinea's borders should be settled at an early date so that, when independence is attained, Papua New Guinea's relations with its near neighbours will not be plagued by the kind of territorial disputes which in other parts of the world have done so much to hinder the developments of fruitful and mutually beneficial relations between close neighbours. We welcome the successful delineation of the Papua New Guinea/Indonesia border and attach considerable importance to the early negotiation of administrative arrangements between Australia/Papua New Guinea and Indonesia to avoid potential sources of friction on the Papua New Guinea/Indonesia border. I regret that despite my Government's best endeavours early progress towards agreement on the border between Australia and Papua New Guinea seems unlikely and final agreement may have to await Papua New Guinea's independence.

As well as the close personal, official and political links that have grown between Australia and Papua New Guinea, there are several strong common interests which we share. Perhaps the most important of these is our shared interest in further consolidating our friendly ties with our closest neighbour, Indonesia. Not only must our three countries co-operate in the interests of our own peoples and of the region in which we are situated, but we must in our mutual relations seek to set an example of harmonious regional co-operation. Similarly in the other area of close interest to both of us, the South Pacific, we should, in the future, seek with Papua New Guinea and our other friends in the Pacific to build on progress so far achieved in developing regional co-operation, friendship and partnership. The recent meeting of the Pacific Forum attended by both Papua New Guinea and Australia was a useful step in this direction."

MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES:

Multinational companies, argues Professor Elliott of the Singapore National Trade Union Council, have helped to modernize and diversify the Singapore economy. But it is important, he argues, that the Asian trade unions establish a common strategy in dealing with these giant corporations, to counter not only the latters' excessive power but also protectionist tendencies of trade unionists in the developed countries. This paper was presented at a seminar on employment policy for Asian trade unionists, organized by the Asian-American Free Labour Institute in Manila, the Philippines, during April.

Multinationals in Developing Countries

T.H. Elliott

STATELESS giants they may be as Otto Kersten has called them but it seems that no one can regard the Multinational Corporations unemotionally and this is particularly the case in the developing countries. Reactions vary from an uncritical enthusiastic acceptance, to frank rejection. Strangely enough there seems to be no middle ground attitude – the response is all or none. In Singapore our attitude has been almost total acceptance and it might be useful to indicate some of the reasons. There are many different aspects to the problem of relations between multinational corporations and host developing countries which require to be carefully distinguished.

For convenience I will consider interactions from three points of view – the economic, the political and at the trade union level. I will draw my experience mainly from Singapore, where for some years now we have had the opportunity of living at close quarters with quite a variety of multinationals from quite a variety of countries and try to outline some of the problems, and a few of the answers we have discovered.

* * * * *

FIRSTLY at the political level, host countries and multinationals come together and enter into agreements because they believe initially these will be beneficial. The multinationals in terms of their corporate objectives want greater profits, additional manufacturing facilities and low-cost labour. The host country wants job opportunities for its possibly unemployed citizens, an upgrading of its industrial technology and a better balance of trade with the rest of the world. This it believes can be achieved at least in part through offering offshore hospitality to multinational corporations which possess a ready-made world market, utilize advanced technological concepts in their manufacturing processes, and apply the latest management techniques in the running of their organizations. It is the hope of the politicians that some or all of these benefits will spin off and upgrade the host country's economy. The multinationals with an obligation to their shareholders and corporate objectives hope with new sources of cheap and trainable labour operating in a politically stable environment to increase their earning capacity.

This theoretically initially beneficial relationship is however vitally affected by three fundamental forces:

- The fact that political and economic nationalism is becoming even stronger in developing countries. This nationalist tendency manifests itself in the political leadership by a desire to exercise full control over national affairs, generate sufficient resources for sufficiently strong economic growth to reduce the earning gap between workers in developed and under-developed countries, and hopefully to achieve a minimum quality of life. The relationship can collapse if the multinational does not understand and promote these objectives.
- The power that multinationals exercise in effecting economic, political and social changes in the host country. As an indication, the world GNP is estimated to be $3,000 billion, shared as follows: USA $1,000 billion, other developed countries $1,000 billion, Russia and China $650 billion, and the under-developed world $350 billion. Much of this product in both the developed non-Communist and under-developed countries is in the hands of the multinationals whose growth is at the rate of 12 per cent as compared with the world average of 5 per cent. Clearly the multinationals are a growing force and a force to contend with.
- The capital needs of developing countries for growth are greater than are available from either international agencies or foreign governments, and developing countries consider that investment of multinational funds in their countries can bridge the gap. Failure on either side to understand the categorical imperatives of the other side can cause a breakdown in relations and from the host country's point of

view there are five major criticisms of the multinational corporations:-

- The Multinational Enterprise (MNE) has had an adverse effect on the balance of payments of the developing countries in which it invests because it takes out more in the form of scarce foreign exchange from the host country than it brings in.
- The MNE has not made a sufficient effort to modify the resources (technical, managerial) it transfers to meet the requirements of developing countries, resulting in a less than optimal development of indigenous resources.
- The respective career backgrounds of senior corporate executives and host government officials are quite dissimilar, resulting in major differences of orientation and motivation. Neither MNE executives nor host government officials have made an attempt to recognize these differences or their effect on communications between the parties.
- The MNE has not made a sufficient and sustained effort to cultivate effective relations with host government officials of developing countries. This is largely due to limited appreciation or acceptance of the fact that the host government is the major determinant of a company's success in a particular country.
- The MNE has not undertaken an effort to educate key opinion-forming groups, including trade unionists and the younger generation (notably students), in developing countries. It has been preoccupied with issues of daily operations without regard for the long-term accommodation tasks it must perform.

In Singapore we have responded positively to each of these problems

As regards balance of payments, we have no natural resources, consequently we must export manufactured goods to live and multinationals coming here are carefully selected on the basis of the criterion of added value. Those industries where the added value is low are not allowed in. Nor do we face the problem of multinationals exploiting and exporting exhaustible natural resources since labour is our only national resource.

We require all multinationals to train technicians either in Singapore or in the base country in excess of the needs of the corporation, and in most cases, by having a joint enterprise, ensure that there is an adequate mix of managerial skill. In any case foreign management is costly, because fringe benefits are prohibitive, and multinationals are forced to use local management talents for which the Universities are geared to produce adequate supplies.

Career background differences are not marked. The Singapore Government has, with the exception of Japan and the Philippines, the highest proportion of businessmen in government the South East Asia. This leads to an easier dialogue and reduces mutual suspicions.

Our civil servants tend to be businessmen first and civil servants second. Singapore has set up major governmental business promotion departments: the Economic Development Board which promotes Singapore as a location for the multinationals and decides which multinationals will come in; the National Productivity Board devoted to increasing national productivity; Intraco – a state trading organization for buying and selling goods of all descriptions; and the Development Bank, which in the main provides joint financing funds. The main problem area is the failure of multinationals – particularly the Japanese – to identify with our local problems, but on the whole at present this is not a serious matter as we make considerable efforts to understand the multinationals.

To summarize our political position, we have a strong Government with clear political objectives which are essentially, to increase our material standards of living and distribute national earnings more evenly. Multinationals from all countries and in all spheres of activity are situated in Singapore, and so no one multinational can gain political control.

Our political leaders understand the multinationals' objectives clearly and are pleased when the multinationals make large profits for then they know that the companies will not interfere politically in the country. And Singapore's sense of political unity is sufficiently strong to ensure that the multinationals will not erode her culturally or alter her social values.

So much for the political aspects of the problem. The major test, however, is in the size of the contribution of multinationals to economic development.

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BETWEEN 1960 to 1971, the Singapore Gross Domestic Product (at factor cost) grew at an average rate of 11 per cent. During the same period, the manufacturing sector grew at an annual rate of 20.7 per cent – nearly double the rate of GDP growth. Appendix I illustrates this. In 1960, the manufacturing sector contributed S$187.4 million or 9.2 per cent of GDP. In 1971, this contribution had reached S$1,409 million – 23 per cent or over one-fifth of GDP.

The manufacturing sector is currently the most dynamic in the Singapore economy. In the years between 1960 to 1971, the number of manufacturing establishments rose by almost 300 per cent, and the value of manufacturing output increased tenfold. Direct exports of manufactured goods in 1970 were over nine times that of 1960. The number of people employed in manufacturing rose from 27,400 in 1960 to over 161,000 at the mid-1972 count (see Appendix II).

The growth statistics of the industrial sector are substantial. And multinational enterprises, which form the major portion of the foreign investments in Singapore,

have played a major part. This can be discerned from Appendix III.

Though wholly foreign-owned or foreign joint venture establishments in 1970 constituted only 17.6 per cent of the total number of firms in the manufacturing sector, these firms comprised nearly 50 per cent of the total output value, 62.5 per cent of the value added, 44 per cent of total employment, 55 per cent of total sales and nearly 70 per cent of the direct exports of manufacturing goods.

A comparison of the products manufactured by major companies in Singapore in 1960 and 1972 (Appendix IV) indicates the pre-eminent position of the multinational establishments. Nearly all the products under the 1972 column are manufactured by multinational enterprise establishments.

The list contrasts the changes in product and production sophistication in the manufacturing sector. The change-over has been from the import-substitution, domestic market goods like foodstuffs in 1960 to export-oriented, higher technology products like optical lenses, cameras and precision ball bearings by 1972. The development of skills is reflected too in the new product lines instituted by the foreign establishments.

The gross fixed assets (Appendix V) of foreign investments in Singapore totalled S$1,572.5 million in 1971 – ten times the amount seven years earlier. The top foreign investor last year was the United States (32 per cent) followed by the United Kingdom (19 per cent), the Netherlands (18 per cent), and Japan (7 per cent). If approved commitments and projects in the pipeline are taken into account, the total amounts form an even stronger picture.

The multinational enterprise has come to stay in Singapore. It has brought economic and technological benefits. Singapore has promoted multinational enterprises as much for the capital inflow as for the technology, the training of skills and the markets they bring.

The multinational enterprise has played a significant role in helping to modernise and diversify the Singapore economy. It is a large employer of labour and a valuable developer of high technical skills. It is one of the most efficient vehicles for the transfer of technology and for the injection of outside capital with consequent multiplier effects. It has brought in new business organization methods and entrepreneurial, management and financial sophistication. It has also helped establish a desired export approach in industrialization with its assured international markets.

Had Singapore relied solely on indigenous industrial capability it is doubtful whether we could have attained the same pace of progress.

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IN Singapore the principal objectives of multinational enterprises are varied.

Some plants have been established to manufacture high quality parts and components at competitive cost for supplying parent companies or affiliate divisions in various parts of the world. Examples of this type of corporation lie in the electronic and electrical components industry and in the mechanical and precision engineering industry where world leaders in their fields such as Fairchild, Texas Instruments, Litton, Hewlett Packard, North American Rockwell, Olivetti, Siemens, Matsushita and Timex have set up plants.

Others come to produce finished products in large volume at relatively low cost for their international markets. General Electric of the United States, Phillips of the Netherlands, Rollei of Germany, Beecham of Britain and Nippon Miniature Bearing of Japan are some good examples.

Some take advantage of Singapore's geographical position in this part of the hemisphere to invest in the petroleum and related industry. Such companies include Shell, Esso, Mobil, British Petroleum and Amoco.

There are other companies that utilize Singapore's location to produce capital equipment or provide major supporting services. These include shipbuilding, ship-repairing and oil-rig construction. Some major companies in this category are Vosper Thornycroft and IHI in the shipbuilding and repairing industry; Bethlehem Steel, LeTourneau and Levingston in the offshore oil drilling activities.

Some exploit Singapore as an investment base or launching site for establishing branch manufacturing operations in neighbouring countries. Union Carbide, Metal Box, National Semiconductor and Sanyo are relevant examples.

Singapore is also favoured as an international technical servicing and warehousing centre for the supply of spare parts and after-sales service and for training dealers, technicians and maintenance and repair crews in Asia.

Finally, some companies set up engineering, design and consultancy services ranging from civil engineering, construction and industrial plant design to geophysical research and computer services to serve the region.

If Singapore has benefited from the multinational enterprise, the latter has also benefited from locating in Singapore. They have found in Singapore an economic climate highly conducive to investment and growth. Such a climate has been built up from the nation's political stability, and the Government's established policy of encouragement of private enterprise.

The multinational enterprise enjoys lower production cost from wages about one-tenth those of the US, one-fifth those of Europe and one-third those of Japan, and from the availability of relatively lower raw material prices. Delivery of the companies' products on time is ensured by the contribution of the labour force and the excellent transportation network offered by Singapore, the world's fourth largest port and South-East Asia's air cargo hub. They have gained from the high productivity

of the Singapore workers whose good general education and high achievement motivation has fostered adaptability to modern skills. Singapore's trade unions maintain close dialogue with management and the Government and are committed to the principle that higher pay must be geared to higher productivity and higher levels of skill. Singapore further provides an excellent physical infrastructure, sophisticated financial and commercial activities and an efficient worldwide communications network to the investor.

* * * * *

STRANGELY enough our problems are not at the political or the economic level but at the trade union level and these problems are not of our own making but are, in a sense, imported.

Trade unionists in Singapore welcome the multinationals as much as the politicians and the economists for the manifest benefits they bring and feel confident that they can deal with the more obvious problems. From a trade union point of view we welcome the multinationals because we now are enjoying full employment whereas ten years ago we had a serious unemployment problem. Wages have undeniably gone up and our bargaining position has improved proportionately. Even if the multinationals have not been the main contributors to this state of affairs, they have substantially influenced it.

As trade union leaders we have made a deliberate effort to understand the objectives of multinationals, and to come to terms with them. We realized at an early stage that there would have to be some give and take. We realized that directors of multinational corporations would come to Singapore with their own prejudices, and their own way of doing things. We also realized that this would mean, if we were to get the full benefits for our workers from the multinational presence, an adjustment of some of our cherished notions. So we settled down to make a serious study of American, British, European and Japanese labour relations and work out agreements beneficial to our workers that would not be incompatible with the preconceptions of the multinationals.

I made a case study of Roller and was personally involved in establishing harmonious labour relations with that company — a German multinational, which has been spectacularly successful in Singapore. We built our relations around the German concept of the works council. The results of our efforts have been generally good. We have had virtually no strikes in the last few years, wages have gone up and the skills of workers have been upgraded out of recognition. Our workers now have a reasonable chance of living a decent life reasonably free from economic worries, and enjoy opportunities to advance themselves in proportion to their abilities.

Our worries come from the trade union organizations in the developed western world, which are, regrettably, developing protectionist attitudes, fearing that the multinationals will transfer their bases to the under-developed countries and thereby diminish the job opportunities for workers in the western developed world. Some of these fears may well be legitimate, and increasing attention is being given to the problem by trade unionists in the western developed world, but the problem has not been occupying the attention it deserves from the Asian region. The International Labour Organization (I.L.O.) has set up a committee of experts to study multinational operations, and it is vital for us in Asia to develop an Asian attitude on the question of multinational corporations. Because when the foreign unions consider multinational corporations, they do so from the point of view of their own interests — it might be enlightened self-interest or it might unenlightened self-interest. And when the Western Labour Organizations consider the question of multinational corporations they do so in West European perspectives. We in Asia have to develop our own perspectives because the headquarters in Brussels of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) will be formulating an international labour strategy which will certainly incorporate the attitudes of the West European Federations and also we hope the attitudes of Asian labour.

A major reason is the absence of any national or international control supervision of multinational operations as they affect social and employment policy. And we in Asia must take an intelligent interest in the initiative taken by the ICFTU, in collaboration with ICFTU's associated International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) to study the operations of the stateless giants in some depth with a view to the formation of a genuinely international labour strategy to meet the challenges posed to the interest of labour by the growing proliferation of these giant corporations which appear to be subordinate to no national or international modes of supervision or codes of socio-economic conduct.

But criticism of the activities of the multinational corporations because of their freedom from national or international restraint is also being exploited by powerful trade union protectionist groups in some of the highly developed industrial countries of the west and in Japan. And if these protectionist tendencies in the developed industrial countries grow, it will be to the detriment of peoples in the developing countries. We must acknowledge that the International Free Trade Union Movement led by the ICFTU, has always committed itself to reversing the widening gap between the developed and developing worlds. There are all kinds of gaps; there is a widening income gap generated by the ever-widening technological gap and compounded by unequal terms of trade between the developed and the developing economies. It follows that the commitment of international free labour to the imperatives of economic and social development in the Third World imposes a corresponding obligation on us to fight the growth of these protectionist tendencies in the advanced industrial societies. And this means that the strategy to be developed in

dealing with multinational corporations should not be allowed to inhibit the still sluggish flow of investment of industrial capital to the Third World and the concomitant spread and diffusion of technological know-how.

So many of the advanced countries, the Soviet Union included, are only interested in selling developing countries their ideologies but not their technologies. A survey of the recent spurt in the economies of developing countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea reveals the significant role played by foreign industrial investments from America, Western Europe and Japan.

Any discouragement of this flow of industrial investment capital can only serve to damage the commitment of International Free Labour to narrow the development gap between the developed and developing world. In the circumstances the International Free Labour Movement cannot allow any distortion of its perspectives in relation to the operation of multinationals by protectionist tendencies in the developed countries.

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HAVING emphasized this it is still important that a thorough study be made of the activities of the multinational companies in so far as they adversely affect the interests of development and of labour in the developing countries.

The most obvious danger to developing societies posed by multinational companies is the political risk which ensues if a single multinational company and its auxiliary supporting industries are allowed to secure an overwhelming domination of the economic life of a developing country. Japanese monopoly capital for example is really monopoly capital in South Korea. And South Korean administrators know that South Korean political arms can be twisted from Tokyo. Although in the main a government problem, trade unionists should support governments of developing countries in their efforts to diversify as much as possible multinational investments in their own countries as has been attempted in Singapore. It would be disastrous for any developing country to put all its eggs in the Japanese basket or all its eggs in the American basket.

Trade unions however in South-East Asia are more immediately concerned with the unwillingness of several multinational corporations to respect basic ILO standards and conventions and in particular the right of their employees to freely organize through *Bona fide* trade unions. In Singapore, we have had to deal and we still have problems with some American multinationals which refuse to recognize trade unions in spite of the clear provisions of the law.

Organized labour in the developing world deserves and expects that the full strength of international labour opinion should be brought to bear so as to ensure that ILO's standards and conventions are strictly observed by all foreign investors in developing countries. Another serious complaint against multinational companies is the exploitation of cheap labour in developing countries. What is equally disturbing is the fact that the governments of developing countries, in the competition between them to attract foreign investments, accentuate such exploitation by offering the lowest possible wage costs. However, it would not be feasible to require that employees of multinational corporations in developing countries should enjoy American or West European rates of pay. That would only serve to distort the economies of the developing countries, but a strong case can be made for laying down minimum standards of remuneration for employees of multinational corporations in the developing countries, and if the ILO could lay down such minimum standards as it has already done for seamen in the developing countries, this would help to eliminate the present unhealthy competition between developing countries to attract foreign capital.

Arising out of these considerations at the Tenth Regional Conference of ICFTU-ARO held in Kuala Lumpur in February 1973 the delegates at the conference adopted a Declaration on the operation of multinational companies for submission to the ICFTU Executive Board. Reproduced below, it indicates the strategy for Asian trade unionists in dealing with and coming to terms with the Multinational Corporations.

ASIAN DECLARATION ON THE OPERATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES

THE operations of multinational companies, where these are conducted without any national or international control and supervision in so far as they affect socio-economic policies, are a source of increasing concern. Very often the operational and other decisions of the multinational companies are not taken in the host country itself, but emanate from centres outside local jurisdiction. The Asian Regional Organization of the ICFTU and its affiliates will give their support to any initiative taken by the ICFTU, in collaboration with the ITS's to study the operations of multinational companies, in some depth, with a view to the formulation of an international labour strategy to meet the challenges posed to the interests of labour by the proliferation of these giant corporations, which appear to be subordinate to no national or international modes of supervision or codes of socio-economic conduct.

In the formulation of such an international labour strategy, it is crucial to ensure that the legitimate interests of Asian labour are given due consideration and are incorporated as an integral part of any such international approach.

Emphatic attention must be drawn to the fact that the criticism of the activities of multinational corporations, and the serious general concern generated by their freedom

from national or international restraints is also being exploited, for their own purposes, by powerful protectionist groups in some of the highly developed industrial countries of the West, and in Japan. A trenchant reminder is necessary that the growth of such protectionist sentiment in the developed countries will prove seriously detrimental to the real interests of developing countries.

The international free trade union movement has always committed itself to halt and to reverse the widening development gap between the developed and developing sectors of the international Community. There is the widening income gap, generated by the ever widening technological gap, and compounded by unfair, unequal, and unjust terms of trade between the developed and developing economies. The commitment of international free labour to the imperatives of economic and social development in the Third World imposes a corresponding obligation to fight the growth of protectionist sentiments and tendencies in the advanced industrial societies of the west. This means that the strategy to be developed by international free labour, in dealing with multinational corporations should not in any way inhibit the still sluggish flow of investments of industrial capital to the Third World and the concomitant spread and diffusion of technological know-how.

A survey of the recent spurt in the economies of developing countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Hongkong and South Korea, will reveal the significant role played in this regard by movements of industrial capital and technological expertise from North America, Western Europe and Japan. Any discouragement or inhibition of this flow of industrial investment capital can only serve to damage and to detract from the fundamental commitment of international free labour to narrow the development gap between the developed and developing worlds.

In the circumstances, it is vital to ensure that the international free labour movement does not allow any distortion of its perspectives in relation to the operations of multinational companies by protectionist tendencies in the developed countries. Having emphasized this, an objective study of the activities of multinational companies, not only in so far as they adversely affect the rights and interests of labour in the developing countries, but also in all other relevant aspects, is nonetheless urgent and vital.

An obvious danger posed by multinational companies to developing societies is the political risk which ensues if a single multinational company and its auxillaries, are allowed to secure an overwhelming domination and stranglehold over the economic life of any developing country. The governments of developing countries will, therefore, be well advised to diversify, as a matter of principle and as much as possible, multinational investments in their own countries. The proverbial wisdom of not keeping all one's eggs in one basket should serve to guide the approach of governments to all foreign investments.

Trade unions in developing countries are more immediately concerned with the failure, under one pretext or another, of several multinational corporations to respect basic ILO Standards and Conventions, and in particular the right of their employees to organized representation through *bona fide* trade unions. Organized labour in the developing world deserves and expects that the full strength of international public opinion in general, and of international free labour in particular, is brought to bear in order to ensure that ILO Standards and Conventions are strictly observed by all foreign investors in the developing countries.

Another serious complaint against multinational companies is the exploitation of cheap labour in developing countries at sweated rates of remuneration, taking advantage, as they do, of the lack of any adequate social infrastructure. Equally reprehensible, however, is the fact that the governments of developing countries themselves, in the competition between them to attract foreign investments to their own countries, aggravate such exploitation by offering the lowest possible wage costs. It is incumbent on multinational companies operating in developing countries, to make significant contributions to the progressive development of the socio-economic infrastructure.

It is recognized that it would be neither feasible nor desirable to claim that employees of multinational corporations in developing countries should enjoy the higher rates of pay and standards of living prevalent in the developed industrial societies of the west. The only result of such an unrealistic approach would be to upset local wage relativities in the developing countries and to distort their economies. However, a strong case can and should be made out for the laying down of appropriate standards of remuneration and conditions of employment for employees of multinational corporations in the developing countries by an international institution like the ILO. This would protect the workers against exploitation and help to eliminate the present unhealthy competition between the governments of developing countries to attract foreign capital investments.

APPENDICES: STATISTICS AND INDICATORS RELATING TO SINGAPORE'S INDUSTRY

APPENDIX I

Contribution of the Manufacturing and Quarrying Sector to Gross Domestic Product and Relative Growth Rates

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971*	Annual Average Rate of Growth (%)	
								1960-1971	1966-1971
Gross Domestic Product At Factor Cost (S$ million)	3,043.4	3,365.2	3,692.1	4,257.0	4,832.7	5,675.1	6,471.2		
Percentage Change Over Previous Year	12.7	10.6	9.7	15.8	13.5	17.4	14.0	11.0	14.0
Contribution of the Manufacturing and Quarrying Sector to GDP (S$ million)	414.3	486.8	616.5	716.0	897.2	1,143.8	1,490.9		
Percentage Change Over Previous Year	23.4	17.5	26.6	16.1	25.3	27.5	30.3	20.7	25.1
Percentage Share Distribution of GDP	13.6	14.5	16.7	16.8	18.6	20.2	23.0		

*Preliminary

APPENDIX II

INDICATORS OF INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION 1960-1971

All Manufacturing Establishments* Employing Ten or more Persons

PERIOD	*NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS*		*OUTPUT VALUE*		*VALUE ADDED*		*EMPLOYEES*		*DIRECT EXPORTS*	
	No.	% increase	S$m.	% increase	S$m.	% increase	No.	% increase	*S$m.*	% increase
1960	548		465		142		27,416		164	
1961	562	2.6	518	11.1	174	22.5	27,562	0.5	179	9.6
1962	605	7.7	660	27.4	202	16.1	28,642	3.9	217	21.4
1963	858	41.7	844	27.9	253	25.2	36,586	27.7	224	2.9
1964	930	8.4	928	10.0	282	11.5	41,488	13.4	266	19.0
1965	1,000	7.5	1,086	17.0	348	23.4	47,334	14.1	349	31.1
1966	1,123	12.3	1,326	21.0	415	18.5	52,807	11.6	405	16.0
1967	1,200	6.9	1,687	25.0	479	15.4	58,347	12.0	508	35.5
1968	1,586	32.2	2,176	18.9	612	18.1	74,833	17.1	598	17.8
1969	1,714	8.1	3,214	19.7	857	31.2	100,758	32.5	1,265	24.3
1970	1,747	1.9	3,891	21.0	1,094	27.6	120,509	16.3	1,523	35.0
1971	1,834	4.9	4,828	24.0	1,426	30.3	142,748	18.4	n.a.	

*Excludes establishments engaged in rubber processing and quarrying.

APPENDIX III

CONTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN & JOINT VENTURE ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 1970

		CENSUS OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION TOTAL	*ESTABLISHMENTS WITH FOREIGN INVESTMENTS*	*% OF CENSUS TOTAL*
1)	NO. OF ESTABLISHMENTS*	1,747	307	17.6
	(a) Wholly foreign	-	118	6.8
	(b) Joint Ventures with Singapore	-	189	10.8
2)	EMPLOYMENT (NO.)*	120,509	53,433	44.3
3)	OUTPUT** (S$ MILLION)	3,891.0	1,943.0	49.9
4)	VALUE-ADDED** (S$ MILLION)	1,093.7	683.9	62.5
5)	TOTAL SALES** (S$ MILLION)	3,846.1	2,131.1	55.4
	(a) Local Sales	2,323.1	1,069.1	46.0
	% of Total Sales	60.4%	50.2%	-
	(b) Direct Exports	1,523.0	1,062.0	69.7
	% of Total Sales	39.6%	49.8%	-

Note: The Census covers firms employing 10 or more workers.
* For establishments in production and under implementation.
** For establishments in production only.

APPENDIX IV

THE PRODUCTS OF MAJOR MANUFACTURING COMPANIES*

1960		1972	
1.	Sauce and canned food products	1.	Optical Lenses Cameras Projectors Enlargers Electronic Flash guns and other Photographic Equipment
2.	Ice-cream, bakery and confectionery products	2.	Industrial Production Machinery and Tools Electrical Equipment and Appliances Consumer Electronics Products
3.	Biscuits	3.	Electric Motors Industrial Controls Electrical Equipment and Appliances Consumer Electronics Products Housewares
4.	Canned Pineapples	4.	Precision Roller Chains Mechanical Control Systems
5.	Soft-drinks and beer	5.	Precision Tools and Dies Watch Components
6.	Cigarettes	6.	Machinery for the production of feedmill
7.	Rubber footwear	7.	Miniature ball-bearings
8.	Cooking oil	8.	Watch Accessories
9.	Bricks	9.	Precision steel balls
10.	Metal cans	10.	Miniature capacitors, tools, jigs and moulds
11.	Bottles	11.	Cutting tools
12.	Tiger Balm and other medicinal products	12.	Precision machined components Tools and Dies and Precision Stampings
13.	Steel pipes	13.	Industrial Machinery
14.	Cars and commercial vehicles	14.	Refrigeration compressors
15.	Aluminium utensils	15.	Semi-synthetic penicillin
16.	Feedmill	16.	Shipbuilding and repair
17.	Flashlight batteries	17.	Microwave Tubes and Synchres
18.	Engineering services	18.	Aircraft repairs
19.	Paints	19.	Hardware and cutting tools
20.	Textiles	20.	Alloy steel products
		21.	Offshore Drilling Rigs and Marine Structures
		22.	Petroleum Refinery Products
		23.	Electronic instruments and calculators
		24.	Sanders for automative and furniture industries
	Markets: Except for those industries engaged in the processing of regional produce, almost all the above manufactures were catering exclusively for the domestic market.		*Markets:* All the above industries are exporting their products to world-wide markets from Singapore. As they produce either high-price consumer or industrial products they export to developed countries, principally the United States and Europe.

* The products listed under the 1960 column are also being produced in 1972. The 1972 list shows those new products introduced between 1960 and 1972.

APPENDIX V

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY BY GROSS FIXED ASSETS 1965-1971

End Year / Country	1965			1966			1967			1968			1969			1970			1971		
	S$M	%*		S$M	%		S$M	%		S$M	%		S$M	%		S$M	%		S$M	%	
		I	II		I	II		I	II		I	II		I	II		I	II		I	II
USA	23	14.6	–	24	10.0	4.3	27	8.9	12.5	53	11.7	96.3	131	21.8	147.2	343	34.5	161.8	500.8	31.8	46.0
UK	45	28.6	–	53	22.2	17.8	85	28.0	60.4	103	22.7	21.2	122	20.3	18.4	199	20.0	63.1	294.4	18.7	47.9
Netherlands	40	25.5	–	46	19.2	15.0	62	20.5	34.8	81	17.8	30.6	104	17.3	28.4	183	18.4	75.9	274.5	17.5	50.0
Japan	27	17.2	–	30	12.6	11.1	31	10.2	3.3	34	7.5	9.7	36	6.0	5.9	68	6.8	88.9	108.2	6.9	59.1
West Germany	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	0.3	–	1	0.2	–	1	0.2	–	3	0.3	200.0	20.7	1.3	590.0
Others #	22	13.1	–	86	36.0	291.0	97	32.1	102.7	182	40.1	40.6	206	34.3	13.1	199+	20.0	-3.4+	373.9	23.8	37.6
TOTAL:	157	100	–	239	100	52.2	303	100	26.8	454	100	49.8	600	100	32.2	995	100	65.8	1,572.5	100	56.0

NOTES: *% (I relates to percentage composition of total foreign investments by country of origin.
(II relates to percentage increase in investment over the previous year.

\# Consists of Switzerland, Sweden, France, Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Bulgaria, Thailand, etc.

\+ Decline is due solely to reclassification of foreign investment under "Permanent Stay Schemes" as "local capital".

THAILAND: *The term "zonal development" is now being employed freely in Government and foreign-aid organizations in connexion with proposals for development of the northern highlands of Thailand. A New Zealand geographer, who conducted under SEATO auspices a six-month study of ten villages in Chiang Mai Province,* here offers a complete definition of the concept. He shows that implementation will require an overall strategy of planned land use in Northern Thailand.*

Zonal Development-The Basic Proposition

F.G.B. Keen

IT is unfortunate that such a vague and general phrase as "zonal development" (any defined rural or urban space can be defined as a "zone") should have been chosen for a development procedure which, as philosophically conceived, is ecologically sound and of crucial importance. It is worse still that this term should have become popular in North Thailand's upland areas where it may become confused with other objectives expressed by phrases such as "opium suppression", "control of insurgency" etc... While these objectives may have degrees of importance they are minor issues, more symptomatic than causative, and it is necessary that zonal development be not construed as merely the latest in a string of proposals to solve these sorts of problems. Should this occur there is danger that the underlying problem which zonal development is designed to solve, be forgotten until there is no longer an opportunity for the preventive measures which it advocates to be applied.

The objectives of this paper are, therefore, to restate briefly the physical and human processes which have occurred in Thailand bringing about the need for zonal development, and to spell out clearly the underlying principles which the term, as coined, is meant to describe.

In so far as it properly refers to North Thailand, a "development zone" is a watershed, or drainage basin; simply all of the land from which water falling as rain, will flow by means of surface run-off and as streams to one point. Thus drainage basins vary in size from a small valley drained by a few little streams, to the complex system which makes up the final flow of a great river, and each of the small ones complete in itself is at the same time a part of the whole.

Thailand's drainage system is dendritic, formed like a branching tree with a single trunk leading to larger and then smaller branches until it ends in tiny twigs on the perimeter of its growth area. Like the tree, living, growing and working with all of its parts interdependent, the drainage basin too is an evolving, dynamic process.

If the narrow peninsula is ignored, Thailand drains in three directions. On the extreme North-west, to the Salween River in Burma; and on the North-east and East to the Mekong, leaving the centre, including most of North Thailand and the densely settled "heart-land" of the Central Plain as the drainage basin of the Chao Phya. The greater part of the wealth, political power and population of the country is concentrated within the Chao Phya drainage basin so it is pertinent to ask; what, if anything, has the river and its tributaries to do with the pattern of human activities in this "zone"?

* * * * *

TO answer this question we must refer to two distinct processes. The first is the natural one by which rivers form plains. The second is the pattern of human occupance which has evolved in the Chao Phya drainage basin.

Rivers do their work of laying down alluvial plains by a highly complex geomorphological process, but the basic principles may be stated simply. The most important of these is that rivers gain their power to work from the height of the mountains from which they flow and from the precipitation engendered by the presence of these elevated land-masses. Thus, right from the outset it is plain that highland and lowland are part of a single unit. Streams which begin in high places by cutting their own channels in the surface of the earth, move downward until they intercept and unite with other

*F.G.B. Keen was a SEATO Fellow under the organization's 1969-70 Cultural Programme. The report of his Fellowship study, "Upland Tenure and Land Use in North Thailand" has recently been published by SEATO and is available, free of charge, from the SEATO Cultural and Economic Affairs Office, P.O.B. 517, Bangkok, Thailand.

similar flows on their way to the sea. In this way the branching dendritic pattern is formed.

While travelling swiftly down steep slopes, the water has the power to carry a "sediment load" of rock and soil particles which it washes off its banks and cuts from its bed. At some point on its journey towards sea-level, the slope becomes less steep, so that the stream slows and begins to deposit its load on the bottom. This, of course, reduces the slope still further, slows the stream again; and of necessity it must swing in new directions seeking a continuous channel to the sea. In doing so it leaves parts of its former bed as alluvial plain or swamp. Close to the sea itself, tide effects halt all water movement for regular periods, which speeds up the process of deposition to such a degree that a delta will commonly form, with fingers of flowing water interspersed with segments of recently deposited dry or semi-dry land.

A flight on a clear day from Chiang Rai to Bangkok illustrates this process clearly. The first tiny streams descend rapidly, cutting deep and narrow channels as they go. Very soon they begin to slow down, dropping their loads of alluvial gravel and soil, widening and raising the valley floors. As the streams unite and leave the confinement of the narrow valleys, the process continues on a larger scale, until, nearing Bangkok we are able to appreciate the broad Central Plain. This great expanse of flat land is the impressive (though never to be finished) achievement of the Chao Phya itself, of the myriad streams which flow into it, and of the mountains which are its source of energy.

In so far as it affects human occupance, the *rate* at which the drainage basin does its work is the critical factor. If it is evolving slowly and regularly we can adjust our lives to it with security and comfort. On the other hand when it is subject to sudden and violent changes we suffer in proportion. As the water is the working agent, it follows that the pattern of water-flow, or "run-off" has the greatest influence of the physical conditions of the drainage basin, and therefore on human welfare.

In the Chao Phya basin, with a monsoon climate of distinct wet and dry seasons, the influence of run-off on man is further accentuated, because throughout the months of no rain he must depend on continuously flowing streams. In the rainy season by contrast he must hope that he is not the victim of too great a flow.

The first agricultural settlement on the alluvial and swampy Central Plain began presumably because the settlers were in possession of paddi-rice which was tolerant of the low-lying and wet land which they found spread over a space far greater than they at first could occupy. For a very long period in his history man in the Central Plain has been able to keep pace with population growth by expanding on the perimeter of his original settlement, finding a similar physical environment, and so not being forced into technological change. The simple cultivation of rice in paddis sufficed him as his slowly increasing numbers filled first the broad plain, and more recently its finger-like extensions into the long valleys.

The traditional culture of the lowland Thai rice-growers was classically adjusted to the working of the Chao Phya. The rice grew with the slowly rising water, and ripened as it subsided. The heavy, dense mountain forests, a natural vegetation response to the cooler and wetter conditions, governed the rainy season run-off, holding the water back, cushioning its impact on the steep slopes, so that the mountains stored most of it within themselves as "ground water", releasing it slowly and steadily. The water still did its work, cutting away the hills and building the plains; but so slowly that the change was imperceptible to the man with the buffalo. Neither could he perceive that the forest so far away was as essential an element to his survival as the soil which clung to his feet and the water which flowed in his irrigation channels.

In the last century or two, small groups of minority people (the currently much discussed hilltribes) have settled in the northern highlands as part of a general southward movement of these folk in South-East Asia. Supporting themselves by shifting cultivation, they, like the lowland majority, have been dependent on a particular type of physical environment; in their case, the forest, which after burning provided them with the fertility needed for their crops. As their numbers increased they again copied their lowland counterparts, that is to say they chose to expand their area rather than modify their technology.

* * * * *

THE most obvious change in the geography of Thailand in the post-war decades has been the dramatic upsurge of population. This occurred *after* the slow growth of past centuries had already filled the flat plains and valley floors so that the lowland rice villages have been subjected to serious over-crowding, in terms of the technological level at which they operate. True to their tradition, the people have responded by expansion instead of intensifying land-use, and the only empty spaces have been in the forested highlands, where now, as a result of this latest migration (which is still going on) Thai outnumbers hilltriber by a considerable margin. In the mountains the newcomers have resorted to the slash and burn methods of those who came before them, but lacking any experience have been even more wasteful.

A further increment of population, and a very destructive one has come from outside Thailand's borders, as opium-growing hilltribesmen fleeing from the chronic political insecurity of neighbouring countries have greatly boosted the total number of this group within the country. Their method of cultivation rapidly results in complete and relatively permanent forest destruction, because they repeat their annual crops for long periods and sources of forest regrowth are destroyed.

So overwhelming has the human presence become that it is no longer possible for individuals to cut the forest in a chosen area and burn just the amount of land needed to

plant a crop in the ashes. In the present state of chaos, virtually the whole of North Thailand's forests are swept with fire each season, some by design and the rest by uncaring accident. Thus the significant physical change within the Chao Phya basin has been the destruction of the forest which controlled the run-off. Controlled run-off formed this basin as a habitat for man, but uncontrolled run-off will as surely destroy that habitat.

* * * * *

A complete survey by aerial photography would give the precise percentage of former forest which has now been converted to grassland by annual fires, but regrettably this has not been carried out. In the meantime most informed opinion puts the figure at more than 50 per cent, while sample surveys by the writer and others indicate that on critically high and steep areas the percentage may rise to 100.

There are other indications of the degree to which the stability of the Chao Phya basin is in jeopardy. Recent records show that the sediment load of the Ping River, at the point where it joins the Chao Phya has increased nine-fold over a period of four years. Each year wet season flooding with loss of rice crops on the Central Plain is becoming more marked, and at the other end of the spectrum, tobacco production records in Chiang Mai show that on the average the water is drying up a month earlier than it was five years ago.

Any "natural" fluctuation such as an abnormally dry or wet monsoon at the present stage would produce an extreme situation, but in any case, steadily recurring and rapidly worsening floods and droughts are the only realistic prognosis which one could make for the near future; such is the behaviour of man in the Chao Phya basin. It is not a difficult forecast to make, as the phenomenon is not new. History contains numerous examples of disasters occurring as a result of large-scale destruction of highland forests. We need only point to China and India in the twentieth century for grim reminders, and to commonsense for an explanation.

From the viewpoint of human welfare, a serious malfunction of the drainage basin evolutionary system has occurred. Removal of the forest has speeded up the run-off rate in the wet season, causing floods, and as a result insufficient water is stored to maintain dry season flow. So the floods are followed by droughts.

Man has attempted to solve the problem of uneven run-off by building dams; politically most attractive, but enormously expensive and sadly ineffective, as developed in Thailand, where they collect not only water but large quantities of silt from the bare burnt hills behind them. To be useful, dams must collect water from a catchment thickly covered with a dense, preferably forest-type vegetation. In these circumstances they "conserve" water *in addition* to that stored naturally as ground-water, and man profits from his expense and effort. However, as used in Thailand they are a poor and temporary substitutes for what the forested mountains would provide if only the trees were permitted to grow. It is perhaps cynical to speculate on the possible uses for the flat land which must form behind these newly erected dams. Surely when they have filled level the new plains will be too expensive for agriculture!

* * * * *

FROM this background it is now possible to define the central task of development in the Chao Phya basin, to say what it is, as well as what it is not. It *is* reafforestation of the northern highlands to restabilize the run-off rate and distribute the flow of water over the whole year. It is *not* opium suppression, tribal integration and welfare, insurgency control, or any of the minor issues which because of their political attractiveness, keep obscuring the real task.

The concept of zonal development attacks the problem of stabilizing run-off where it begins, in the small watersheds which make up the rim of the Chao Phya basin. These minor basins are the "development zones", and the basic proposition is simply that any action which has the effect of slowing down the run-off at this early stage where streams are small, affects positively all the land down below it and therefore goes some way towards solving the total problem.

Ideally, if it were possible to remove all human population from the northern highlands, give the land complete protection from fires spreading from the valleys and undertake a vigorous programme of replanting the trees, the core of the problem would be solved in a decade. However it would be difficult to prevent other illegal immigrants from at once filling the vacuum, aside from the widespread and serious resentment which any such large-scale attempt at mass relocation would engender. Besides, where could perhaps a million or more people be resettled? It seems obvious that the existing settlers must be allowed to stay. The best that can be achieved is to prevent their numbers from increasing, and to reorientate their economic activities so that they cease doing harm to the watershed.

The highlands consist of a variety of terrains, from the precipitously steep to the almost flat. What must be done first is to concentrate the agriculture by which people live on the gentlest slopes, and to intensify production on these places so that the steep land can be returned to forest. Thus the first task of zonal development is to *classify the land* for economic capability. The combination of need and the facts of terrain divide it neatly into three classes.

The steepest and most rocky slopes, usually at high altitudes, come into the category of *watershed protection forest* which must never be cut or burnt for any reason. A small amount of controlled wilderness recreation would be the only direct "use" to which this class of land might be put. The next class is *production forest*, or tree-crop land which would include orchards for fruits, nuts and beverages as well as timber trees. This would be less steep than protection forest and therefore suitable for direct economic use, either as "cut and replant" perpetual forestry or as mini-terraced orchards. The third category, *agri-*

cultural land, would consist of valley bottoms, and some gently sloping terraces and plateaux.

This first stage of development, land capability classification, is an urgent matter to avoid further extension of the haphazard, illogical activity which is taking place at present in the few places where anything is being done at all. Unilateral decision-making has already resulted in good irrigable land of gentle slope being taken over for forestry within the highlands. This kind of error is almost bound to occur where no basis for overall planned development has yet been accepted.

Once the land in a development zone is classified, the next step is to place some kind of *tenure* over it to ensure its proper use. The present tenure of the northern highlands places it under the completely negative injunction of "forest reserve" within which any kind of exploitation is illegal. It should be replaced by forms of tenure having both negative and positive inducements. Whereas under the present system the choice lies between cutting the forest and growing a crop, or not cutting the forest and going without, a new tenure system must give a permanent right to cultivate one class of land at the same time as it forbids cultivation of another. If the individual has a title to use a certain piece of land in perpetuity, it takes on "site value" for him, which means not only that he has a satisfactory base for investment in permanent improvements, but also that he has excellent reasons for co-operating with the government's objective of keeping newcomers out.

In view of the vital importance to the plains-dwellers of conservative highland land-use, the right to use selected areas in the hills should never be extended to outright ownership of the land itself. The usehold right is adequate for security and it should be granted in perpetuity on condition that land-use practices are non-damaging to the watershed. Thailand's system of land titles already includes a "development title" *(Naw Saw Sam)* applicable to the lowlands, which grants the right to occupy and develop a defined area. As the law stands now this title may be translated to full ownership *(Chanode)* by the execution of a legal survey, but a relatively minor legal change would prevent highland occupiers from obtaining complete ownership. The holder of the *Naw Saw Sam* on the plains is free to transfer his title to another person and to sell the improvements which he has carried out. This practice could be adopted in the same way for highland agricultural land. The national well-being is protected as long as the government can revoke the usehold in the event of unsatisfactory land-use.

These principles of tenure are just as relevant to the exploitation of production forest. For example, the right to cut timber trees must depend upon three things: careful extraction, maximum utilization of the resource, and satisfactory replanting.

It cannot be over-emphasized that a properly applied land-tenure system is the key to achieving reafforestation, the central objective of zonal development. A million or more people bear witness to the ineffectiveness of the present organization, and as each day passes they are joined by more.

The third and last stage of implementing zonal development is a matter of carrying out correctly a few fundamental and familiar tasks. The careful terracing and bunding of gentle slopes and valley bottoms where water is available for agriculture is the first job. It is worthwhile noting that, provided the slopes are not steep, well designed terraces retain run-off much as does forest. The most sensible method would be to avoid the drama and expense of large machinery and use the hand labour which is already on the spot. Wage rates and food costs are still relatively low in Thailand, and such work has the advantages of teaching the required techniques for the type of land-use which is needed, providing an economic alternative to slash-and-burn for people who have never had one, and of identifying local residents with what must be their new life-style.

Next must come narrow but well-designed highland roads which will disturb a minimum of earth in their building, and not wash away. These should be located as far as possible along the boundaries of the separate land categories, defining them clearly and simplifying the problems of supervision.

With these simple physical tasks there must be training and equipping of a strong corps of forestry men so that they will be able to do more than sit helplessly in their depots and headquarters while the forest burns around them.

Other needs will emerge naturally out of development as time passes; these three, the stabilizing of the people and agriculture, the provision of the right kind of communications, and the protection and planting of trees are the primary ones of zonal development.

* * * * *

IN summary what is offered is a feasible means of maintaining the Chao Phya basin as a habitat for human beings by correcting a malfunction in a vital process. Run-off must be regulated to avoid the violent fluctuations which lead to destruction and death. Zonal development is essentially a practical approach to the problem because major drainage basins are made up of many minor ones, each of which can be tackled independently, a logical method of sub-dividing a task which might otherwise prove unmanageable. The idea does not involve new or revolutionary philosophy. The recognition that man must function within the broad pattern of naturally evolving physical systems (which is what zonal development is about) appears in the earliest writings of Buddhist and Christian philosophy.

A moment's reflection will show that there are many fringe benefits to be had by following this policy for development of the northern highlands of Thailand. These include answers to well-known problems of the region which the writer has dismissed as "minor issues". The reason for excluding these issues from this discussion has been to sharpen the focus on the central task of restabilizing the watershed. This is indeed the heart of the matter; democrat or Communist, abstainer or addict, rich man or poor, all are vulnerable to violent environmental change.

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